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TAX BASE SHARING: 
SIMULATIONS FOR KALAMAZOO COUNTY
Timothy L. Hunt
Senior Research Economist
W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
1987
In late 1985, the Kalamazoo Forum asked the Upjohn Institute to look 
at tax base sharing within their study of tax stucture. This paper 
is an outgrowth of simulations conducted for the Subcommittee on Tax 
Base Sharing. The author benefited from numerous conversations with 
Kalamazoo Forum members, all of whom will remain anonymous to insure 
that they are not implicated in any way with this effort. This 
paper represents the author's views solely, not those of the 
Kalamazoo Forum or the Upjohn Institute.

CONTENTS
I. Introduction ............................ 1
Key Features .......................... 4
Advantages ........................... 6
Disadvantages. ......................... 9
II. Growth of the Property Tax Base in Kalamazoo County. ........ 13
Growth of the Property Tax Base. ................ 14
Effects of Inflation ...................... 17
Effects of Property Tax Abatements ............... 20
Measures of Fiscal Disparities ................. 23
III. Minnesota Plan ........................... 28
Background ........................... 28
How the Plan Works ....................... 31
Kalamazoo Simulations of the Minnesota Plan. .......... 35
IV. Selected Alternatives to the Minnesota Plan. ............ 45
Minor Modifications to the Minnesota Plan. ........... 45
Tax Base Sharing Using Local Tax Rates ............. 48
Simulation of Auto Assembly Plant. ............... 52
Regional Economic Growth and Development Fund. ......... 58
V. Conclusions. ............................ 62
Limitations. .......................... 66
Impacts of Tax Base Sharing on Kalamazoo County. ........ 67
Appendix A
Step-by-Step Calculation of the Minnesota Plan for Tax Base 
Sharing. ............................. 72
Appendix B
Technical Description of the Contribution and Distribution 
Formulas in the Minnesota Plan for Tax Base Sharing. ....... 78
Appendix C
Step-by-Step Calculation of Tax Base Sharing as Proposed by 
Michigan House Bill 4859 ..................... 81
Appendix D
Technical Description of the Federal General Revenue Sharing 
Formula. ............................. 84
References. ............................... 87
TAX BASE SHARING: 
SIMULATIONS FOR KALAMAZOO COUNTY 
I. Introduction
Tax base sharing allows residents of participating jurisdictions in an area 
to share the benefits of the growth in the commercial-industrial property tax 
base regardless of where that growth occurs. This sharing does not create a 
new layer of government, however, change existing jurisdictional boundaries, or 
alter local decisionmaking authority.
The concept of tax base sharing may be especially apropos today for a 
number of reasons. Large manufacturing plants may locate next to key rail or 
highway links, while commercial establishments tend to agglomerate in shopping 
districts to improve customer traffic. These business firms serve the needs of 
residents throughout a broad area by providing jobs and products, yet local 
jurisdictional boundaries, which were established long before modern business 
patterns, govern the payment of local property taxes. The net result is that 
some jurisdictions find it difficult to support a given level of services at 
the same time that others are either expanding services or reducing tax 
burdens. Since local governments rely heavily on the property tax, these 
problems have been exacerbated recently by the decline in aid from other 
governmental sources.[1]
Another result is that local jurisdictions have a strong incentive to 
compete aggressively for new commercial-industrial development as long as they
1. Among others, the federal general revenue sharing program is currently 
slated to end December 31, 1986.
perceive the benefits to their jurisdictions to be greater than the costs.
Unfortunately, the hard truth is that there are far fewer major
commercial-industrial development projects today than there are localities.
Witness the frenzied activity of many states and areas to attract the GM Saturn
plant.
Business firms, especially those in basic industries, do not tend to think 
in terms of local jurisdictions. They sell their products throughout an area 
or export those products to other regions, states, or nations. On the other 
hand, their employees are likely to come from all areas within a region. Firms 
have a vital stake in the economic health of a region that has little to do 
with local jurisdictional boundaries. Economic development officials have long 
suggested that localities put aside their inter-jurisdictional rivalries and 
develop a more unified posture. The goal is to enhance regional economic 
growth through this unity and the pooling of available resources.
The region upon which this paper is focused is the Kalamazoo Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA). MSAs are designated by the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
using a variety of criteria, all of which emphasize the degree of 
interdependence within a region and which thereby tend to differentiate it from 
other regions. The notion is that MSAs represent unique areas, in terms of 
local purchases, local labor markets, and commuting patterns. It turns out 
that the Kalamazoo MSA is synonymous with the boundaries of Kalamazoo County.
The purpose of this paper is to make a preliminary evaluation of tax base 
sharing for Kalamazoo County. It is written largely for a nontechnical
audience. More technical aspects of the discussion have been relegated to 
footnotes and appendices. There is also an extensive list of references for 
anyone who wishes to pursue the subject further.
The basic approach of the paper is to use historical data from the local 
jurisdictions within Kalamazoo County to simulate the effects of tax base 
sharing. The remainder of the introduction describes the key features of tax 
base sharing and its advantages and disadvantages. Section II briefly outlines 
the growth of the property tax base in Kalamazoo County. Such a description is 
a necessary prologue to understanding the simulations which follow in Sections 
III and IV. Specifically, the tax base sharing provisions adopted by the 
Minneapolis-St. Paul area are evaluated in Section III, while several 
hypothetical alternatives are evaluated in Section IV. Finally, the 
conclusions of the paper are drawn in Section V.
Tax base sharing became fully operational in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area 
in 1975, hereafter referred to as the Minnesota Plan. Since the Minnesota Plan 
was one of the earliest tax base sharing schemes, it has become the model on 
which to judge other tax base sharing plans.[2] For this reason and the sake 
of convenience, much of the discussion of this paper is couched in terms of
2. Other tax base sharing plans, albeit much more restrictive in scope and 
purpose, have been adopted in two areas, the Hackensack Meadows Redevelopment 
District of New Jersey and Charlottesville, Virginia. In the latter case a set 
mi 11 age is shared by formula between the city and remainder of the county, 
while in the former case school levies are shared among 14 districts affected 
by the redevelopment.
the Minnesota Plan even though the concept is more general and can be readily 
adapted to the specific needs and goals of other areas. In fact, some of the 
simulations presented later in this paper represent a considerable departure 
from the Minnesota Plan.
Key Features
Tax base sharing is a method whereby local jurisdictions may agree to share 
some portion of the growth in their property tax base. As practiced in the 
Minnesota Plan, localities contribute 40 percent of the growth in the 
commercial-industrial property tax base to an areawide pool. The tax base in 
the regional pool is redistributed back to the jurisdictions using a 
predetermined formula. After this allocation, local authorities establish 
their spending requirements and derive the tax rate necessary to meet those 
requirements. This tax rate is applied equally to all classes of property 
physically within each jurisdiction, except that a regionwide average tax rate 
is applied to business property nominally in the regional pool.
The details of the Minnesota Plan are discussed in Section III, but it is 
important at the outset to identify a number of key features of tax base 
sharing. First, tax base sharing generally does not establish a new layer of 
government in the local area because both the contribution and distribution 
formulas are predetermined and made a part of the tax base sharing agreement 
itself. In the Minnesota Plan local jurisdictions continue to independently 
set spending priorities just as they have always done in the past. It does not 
restrict the spending authority of local governments in any way.
Second, it should be mentioned that tax base sharing does not involve the 
imposition of any additional taxes in the region overall. This remains true as 
long as the contributions of tax base to the regional pool are exactly matched 
by the distributions of tax base from that same pool. Of course, individual 
jurisdictions, firms, and residents may be net recipients or contributors, 
depending on the location of future growth.
The third key feature of tax base sharing is that the distribution formula 
does have redistributive aspects. Although such redistribution may be 
controversial, the goal is to redress to some degree the fiscal imbalances 
alluded to earlier in this introduction. These imbalances are created by the 
concentration of businesses in a few districts, whereas the spending required 
to support the local population (which tends to be much more dispersed) is the 
responsibility of many jurisdictions.
The final key feature of tax base sharing is that local jurisdictions share 
a portion of the future growth in the tax base rather than the existing tax 
base. This means that initially tax base sharing has little effect on a 
region. As the region grows and prospers, the shared base also grows and 
becomes relatively more important. Since only 40 percent of the growth in the 
commercial-industrial tax base is shared, however, the bulk of all future 
growth remains in the local jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Minnesota Plan 
includes a limiter that effectively insures that each locality always receives 
a minimum distribution from the shared tax base.
Advantages
There is no agreement about the advantages or disadvantages of tax base 
sharing. In broad terms, it appears that proponents emphasize the importance 
of reducing fiscal disparities, sharing the benefits of regional growth, and 
retaining local autonomy and decisionmaking. Each of these aspects of tax base 
sharing is now discussed in turn.
In general, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations defines 
state-local fiscal disparities as the "...imbalance between the financing 
ability of state-local governments and the responsibilities they bear, and the 
imbalance among different abilities of state and local governments to raise 
revenue." (ACIR, 1980: iii) Obviously, local tax base sharing does not address 
questions pertaining to what level of government -- local, state, or federal   
can or should be responsible for financing specific government services. The 
state and federal tax structure is basically assumed given, although questions 
may arise about the interaction of local tax base sharing with other existing 
intergovernmental aid programs.[3]
The presumption in tax base sharing is that the concentration of business 
firms in a few areas has led to the existence of considerable fiscal 
disparities among local jurisdictions in their abilities to raise revenue. In 
other words, at the local level an uneven distribution of property tax base is
3. These questions, legal and otherwise, are not addressed in this paper.
sufficient evidence that fiscal disparities exist.[4] Local tax base sharing 
then attempts to partially reduce these disparities by sharing the growth in 
the business tax base that occurs anywhere in the region.
In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the residents of the Twin cities 
area were sensitive to the existence of fiscal disparities. That experience 
will be discussed in detail in Section III. Suffice it to say now that tax 
base sharing was actually authorized by the Minnesota Fiscal Disparities Law, 
and it is still commonly referred to in Minnesota simply as "Fiscal 
Disparities." Thus, there should be no question that tax base sharing was 
adopted at least in part to ameliorate the fiscal disparities that were 
perceived to exist in the Twin Cities area.
While any debate about fiscal disparities tends to stress fairness and tax 
equity, it is also thought that there are separate and distinguishable 
advantages from sharing the benefits of regional growth.[5] There would be 
fewer interjurisdictional rivalries for firms because "winners" would only be 
certain of keeping 60 percent of the growth, while "losers" would be assured of 
some benefits from that growth even though it didn't occur within their own 
jurisdictions. At the same time, business tax rates would slowly begin to move
4. It should also be clear that jurisdictions may differ in the amount of 
public services their residents desire. Therefore, economists define fiscal 
disparities as a situation where the tax price for the same bundle of services 
differs.
5. Lyall (1975) stresses this advantage of tax base sharing and actually 
identifies it as the primary reason to support tax base sharing.
toward the regional average as the shared pool grew. These developments would 
tend to encourage more regional thinking, both on the part of firms and local 
governments. The notion is that a broader framework for decisionmaking would 
lead to a more efficient rationalization of the development of the region and 
enhance economic growth generally.
Conceptually, tax base sharing does indeed reduce the incentives for 
competition among local governments and encourages them to work for the growth 
of the area as a whole. Just as important to sharing the benefits of regional 
development is that the growth of the tax base and therefore tax capacity of 
local governments becomes more stable. Paul Gilje of the Citizens League 
(Gilje, 1977: 38) compares this aspect of tax base sharing to purchasing an 
insurance policy. In exchange for the premium of 40 percent of the growth in 
the commercial-industrial tax base, a locality receives a guaranteed share of 
the region's growth. The question is whether or not a locality wants to gamble 
and go it alone or whether it is willing to give up the possibility of a large 
gain for a smaller but more certain share of the regionwide gain in the 
business tax base.
The final advantage of tax base sharing is that it retains the autonomy and 
local decisionmaking authority of local government. Although the tax base is 
shared, local governments continue to decide the size and composition of local 
spending. Tax base sharing therefore tends to equalize the capacity to tax 
rather than actual budgets. Although it will be seen later that tax base 
sharing adds significantly to administrative requirements, it does not add a 
new layer of government to the local area.
Disadvantages
Tax base sharing has had its share of critics. The disadvantages appear to 
fall into three areas. First, since tax base sharing does not create, at least 
directly, either new tax base or new revenues, it is very difficult to gain 
political consensus about any tax base sharing proposal because local 
jurisdictions can always utilize historical data to determine if they would 
have been a "winner" or "loser." In fact, John Kari and Eugene Knaff (1982) 
suggest that the "winners-losers" problem may account for the limited 
acceptance of tax base sharing nationwide.[6]
It is very important to understand the "winners-losers" problem because 
this paper will also present empirical simulations of the impacts of tax base 
sharing using historical data. Under these tax base sharing procedures, it is 
future growth which is shared, not historical growth. It is extremely 
dangerous to presume that past growth patterns will be perpetuated ad 
infinitum. In addition, the "winners-losers" can change cyclically or 
sometimes even abruptly from year to year. Try to imagine the impact that the 
GM Saturn plant would have had on School craft Township and Kalamazoo County 
generally. Does anyone pretend to know what local jurisdiction will be 
adversely affected by the next plant closure?
6. See footnote (2) for the other two areas which have adopted some form of 
tax base sharing. The author is unaware of any other localities in the U.S. 
which have adopted tax base sharing.
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The Minnesota experience with tax base sharing has verified that there may 
be many changes in the fortunes of local jurisdictions over the years. For 
example, the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul were initially net recipients 
of tax base, but recently they have been net contributors (Minnesota Journal, 
November 19, 1985: 1). The primary reason for this change has been a 
resurgence in the construction of office buildings downtown. A recent research 
report from the Minnesota House of Representatives details the dynamic nature 
of the program (Baker and Hinze, 1984).
It should be stressed that historical comparisons by their very nature tend 
to be artificial. The implicit assumption is that all decisions and 
developments would have occurred identically with or without the hypothesized 
program change (in this case, tax base sharing). But one of the goals of tax 
base sharing is to change incentives and influence both the pattern and pace of 
regional economic growth and development. Unfortunately, it does not appear to 
be possible to conduct historical simulations and capture these effects.
Thus, tax base sharing will create "winners" and "losers" in the sense that 
"after the fact" jurisdictions will always be able to calculate if they would 
have been better off or worse off because of tax base sharing alone. Even 
though such comparisons tend to be artificial, historical simulations will be 
conducted in this paper because there does not appear to be any other 
satisfactory way to develop a baseline or gain additional insight into how tax 
base sharing might impact Kalamazoo County. It can only be hoped that the 
results of this paper will be interpreted cautiously and that narrow 
self-interest will not be the only criteria used to evaluate tax base sharing.
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The second major disadvantage of tax base sharing actually questions the 
existence of fiscal disparities and/or whether the changes brought about by 
sharing are desirable. Tiebout (1956) suggests that the existence of many 
local jurisdictions permits a matching of the preferences of households for 
public services with the production of those public services by local 
governments. Fox (1981 a) approaches the issue somewhat differently but reaches 
the same conclusion as Tiebout. Fox suggests that any perceived revenue 
surplus created by business firms is actually compensation to residents of the 
local jurisdictions for undesirable external costs (pollution, traffic 
congestion, etc.) created by those business firms. According to Fox, the 
existence of zoning laws is evidence that business firms are undesirable 
neighbors.
It is far beyond the scope of this paper to critique the theoretical 
arguments for or against the existence of fiscal disparities.[7] Suffice it to 
say that if one concludes that either the status quo is optimal or the fiscal 
benefits from growth represent payment for the undesirable features of business 
firms, then it is obvious that any new program such as tax base sharing 
constitutes a movement away from optimality.
The proponents of tax base sharing obviously reject the notion that the 
existing distribution of tax base, public services, or tax rates resembles
7. The interested reader should consult an earlier Upjohn Institute paper by 
Wayne Wendling (1981c) which specifically addresses the theoretical issues.
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anything close to optimal conditions.[8] They frequently appeal to the Serrano 
vs. Priest decision as evidence that the courts found extreme disparities in 
the abilities of localities to finance public education. Unlike the solution 
for public education, however, the goal of tax base sharing is not to provide 
identical government services to all residents, but to smooth out the capacity 
of local governments to provide those services. Each jurisdiction is then 
allowed to respond to the needs and desires of its own citizens.
Proponents of tax base sharing argue that it is at least an incremental 
step toward optimality. While that tends to be true overall for a region, it 
is not necessarily true for each jurisdiction within the region. For example, 
it is possible for a locality to be above average in terms of its property tax 
base and yet contain virtually no business property. In this situation the 
above average district would add modestly to its wealth through tax base 
sharing because each district always receives a minimum share of the regional 
growth, even if no business growth occurs locally.[9] In other words, tax base 
sharing assumes a more equal distribution of the business property tax base is 
desirable per se, without regard to other factors.[10] That this might not be
8. The exchange between Fox (1981 a) and Reschovsky (1981) represents a brief 
but reasonable summary of the opposing situations.
9. Vogt (1979) found this to be true when he applied a version of the 
Minnesota Plan for tax base sharing to San Diego County, California.
10. Of course, it is possible to account for other factors in a tax base 
sharing plan.
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the case highlights the need for careful study of tax base sharing before 
implementation in any region.
The third and final disadvantage of tax base sharing is one of perception 
only. Tax base sharing has sometimes been misconstrued with other efforts to 
reduce the reliance of local governments on the property tax to raise revenue, 
but there appears to be absolutely no valid reason to think that property tax 
bills will fall with the adoption of tax base sharing.
II. Growth of the Property Tax Base in Kalamazoo County[11]
Simulations of the impacts of tax base sharing on the local jurisdictions 
in Kalamazoo County will be presented in Sections III and IV of this paper. 
First, however, a brief overview of the growth in the property tax base in the 
county and its local jurisdictions is presented. This approach provides the 
necessary institutional framework for the later empirical analysis. The 
discussion includes the effects of property tax abatements and inflationary 
growth in the property tax base because both impact the available property tax 
base to be shared. The section ends with a consideration of some measures of 
fiscal disparities.
11. The raw property tax data discussed in this section and later sections were 
kindly provided by the Kalamazoo County Equalization Office. The author also 
benefited from several long discussions with the Director of that office, James 
Ringler, and with the Kalamazoo County Controller, Wesley Freeland. However, 
the author retains full responsibility for the interpretation and subsequent 
data manipulations.
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Growth of the Property Tax Base
The growth in the taxable value or valuation of the commercial, industrial, 
and personal property tax base in Kalamazoo County is presented in Figure 1 for 
the years 1972 through 1985. The taxable value of each class of property 
includes the total State Equalized Valuation[12] (SEV) plus the taxable value 
of property granted special tax status by Public Acts 198 and 255, known 
popularly as property tax abatements. For simplicity, the commercial, 
industrial, and personal property taxable value are jointly referred to 
hereafter as the business tax base or business taxable value. Property tax 
abatements are discussed separately later in this section.
Figure 1 shows clearly that business taxable value and its three components 
have risen in almost every year from 1972 through 1985. Commercial taxable 
value has grown more than three times faster than industrial taxable value. 
The sharp decline in personal property taxable value in 1975-76 occurred 
because of the repeal of the personal property tax on business inventories in 
that year as part of the implementation of the Michigan Single Business
12. In the Michigan property tax system the taxable value of property is 
one-half its market value. Market value is generally determined by local 
assessors, but state equalization factors are applied across jurisdictions as 
necessary to insure that local governments do not deliberately underassess 
property.
Figure 1
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Tax.[13] Overall, there has been significant growth countywide in the business 
tax base over this period.
Since property taxes are paid on one-half the nominal or market value of 
property, including any inflationary effects, significant taxable growth does 
not necessarily imply that real growth occurred. The effects of inflation on 
the growth of property values is discussed separately in the next subsection of 
the paper.
The growth of the property tax base for the basic tax collection units 
within Kalamazoo County is detailed in Table 1 for the years 1976 through 
1985. The basic tax collection units, as the name implies, are responsible for 
collection and administration of local property taxation within their 
districts. These 19 local jurisdictions, consisting of four cities and 15 
townships, are nonoverlapping and sum exactly to the countywide totals. Total 
taxable value includes business taxable value plus agricultural, residential, 
and developmental[14] SEV. The year 1976 is selected as the base year for this 
analysis to avoid the distortion in the data created by the removal of business 
inventories from business taxable value in 1976.
13. Local districts are compensated by the state for this decline in their tax 
base (Michigan House of Representatives and Michigan State Senate, 1983). For 
more information about the Michigan Single Business Tax, see Michigan 
Department of Treasury (1985).
14. Developmental property is in transition, generally from agricultural usage 
to residential or business usage. It is a small part of total taxable value 
countywide.
Table I
SUMMARY OF GROUTH RATES IN THE BUSINESS TAXABLE VALUE AND TOTAL TAXABLE VALUE
Townships
Alaio
Brady
Charleston
Cl iiax
Coastock
Cooper
Ka la ma zoo
Oshteno
Pavil lion
Prairie Ronde
Richland
Ross
Schoolcraft
Texas
Uakeshna
Cities
Galesburg
Kalaiazoo
Parchsent
Portage
Business
Taxable
Value
(1976)
3,066,663
2,206,105
1,293,149
815,730
70,471,207
5,001,148
51,792,749
33,440,735
4,017,676
1,261,008
4,907,167
4,345,745
12,473,647
2,554,461
729,250
2,135,200
215,215,525
17,600,620
113,252,291
Business
Taxable
Value
(1985)
4,695,600
3,900)002
7)560)262
1)679)446
97)014)617
8)209,527
76)296)050
71)786)075
6)958)749
1,763)716
16,208,610
8,498,860
22,578)900
7)557)375
862)346
5)394)403
380)594)119
26)174)516
306)667)200
Absolute
Change
(1976-85)
1,628,937
1,693)897
6)267,133
863)716
26)543)410
3,208,379
24,503,301
36,345,340
2,940,873
502,708
11,301,443
4,153,135
10,105,253
5,002,914
133,096
3,259,203
165,378,594
10,573,696
193,414,909
Percent
Change
(1976-85)
53.12
76.78
464.64
105.68
37.67
64.15
47.31
114.67
73.19
39.87
230.30
95.57
61.01
195.85
16.25
152.64
76.84
60.08
170.78
Average
Annual
Growth
Rate
Total
Taxable
Value
(1976)
Total
Taxable
Value
(1985)
4.85 
6.54
21.68 
8.35 
3.62 
5.66 
4.40 
8.86 
6.2? 
3.80
14.20 
7.74 
6.82
12.81 
1.88
10.85
6.54
5.37
11.70
14,257,853 
17,380,255
8,430,969
8i853i066
107,944,316
35,523)198
113)643)937
64,356,808
20i759.379
7)797,037 
28i924i622 
30)747,903 
36)768)993 
28,819,042
6,371,050
6,129,900
398,613,300
24i052i370
259)748)813
12)046)503 
752)624)944
41)863)116 
609)881)500
Absolute Percent
Change Change
(1976-85) (1976-85)
5)916)603
354,011)644
17)810i746
350)132)687
96.52
68.81
74.05
134.80
Average
Annual
Growth
Rate
18,552,647
25)783)022
17)914)084
14)562)860
72)211)901
42,822)949
89,314,313
86)550)275
30)424)970
14,406,517
42,911)793
40,564,716
43,087,586
56,162,693
11,278,746
130.12
148.35
212.48
164.50
66.90
120.55
78.59
134.49
146.56
184.77
148.36
131.99
117.18
201.62
177.03
9.70
10.64
13.50
11.41
5.66
9.19
6.66
9.93
10.55
12.33
10.64
9.80
9.00
13.06
11.99
7.80
7.32
6.35
9.95
County Total 546,580,276 1)056,400)415 509,820,139 93.27 7.60 1,219,122,811 2,555,563,785 1,336,440,974 109.62 8.57
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Before proceeding to the analysis of the data from the last decade, it is 
important to understand the difference between relative and absolute growth 
rates. The relative growth (percent changes) of a jurisdiction can be high; 
but, if from a small absolute base, that growth may have only a marginal impact 
on overall growth in the county. In contrast, a slow growing but absolutely 
large district can have a significant impact on the countywide results. 
Furthermore, it is common for smaller jurisdictions to experience wider swings 
in growth rates.
The business taxable value of five localities experienced double-digit 
average annual growth rates over this period, namely Charleston, Richland, 
Texas, Portage, and Galesburg. Of these, only Portage makes the top five list 
in terms of the absolute change in business taxable value. Specifically, 
Portage was first in absolute growth of business taxable value over this 
decade, followed by Kalamazoo City, Oshtemo, Comstock, and Kalamazoo Township 
respectively. These five districts accounted for almost 88 percent of the 
absolute growth in business taxable value in Kalamazoo County in the last 
decade, with Portage and Kalamazoo City alone contributing over 70 percent of 
the countywide growth.
Turning our attention to total taxable value, it is interesting to note 
that the top seven fastest growing localities in relative terms are all 
townships, namely Charleston, Texas, Prairie Ronde, Wakeshma, Climax, Richland 
and Brady. Yet none of these seven makes the list of districts with the 
greatest absolute growth. The number one district in terms of absolute growth 
of total taxable value is Kalamazoo City, followed closely by Portage.
17
Trailing much further back are Kalamazoo Township, Oshtemo, Comstock, Texas, 
and Schoolcraft.
By 1985, the overall picture of Kalamazoo County that emerges shows the 
business tax base in the county to be concentrated in five districts — 
Kalamazoo City, Portage, Comstock, Kalamazoo Township, and Oshtemo. Of these 
five districts, Portage and Oshtemo are becoming relatively more important, 
both in terms of business taxable value and total taxable value.
Effects of Inflation
Historically, prices have tended to rise for many goods and services in the 
U.S. What this means is that the rise in total dollar values may not indicate 
an increase in the physical quantities of goods and services actually being 
produced. Concomitantly, a rise in wages may not signify the ability of 
workers to purchase more goods and services. Therefore, it may be important to 
have some idea if changes are real or due only to the effects of inflation. 
For this reason, economists attempt to statistically adjust or account for 
changes in the price level by using a variety of price indices to deflate 
dollar values.
In Michigan, market values are used to derive the taxable value of parcels 
of property.[15] Since market values include inflationary growth, it is
15. The interested reader can consult Hunt (1985: 92-96) for a brief overview 
of the valuation of business property in Michigan.
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logical to examine the effects of inflation on the growth in property values. 
The overall growth in the business tax base in Kalamazoo County for the years 
1977 to 1985 is presented in Table 2, along with the rates of growth in a 
number of price indices, the Consumer Price Index for the U.S. and Detroit, the 
GNP Implicit Price Deflator, and an inflation rate in property values 
calculated by the Kalamazoo County Equalization Office, denoted in the table as 
the Kalamazoo County Property Price Index. The first three indices are more 
indicative of price changes generally, whereas the local index uses actual 
assessment values across all classes of property throughout the county to 
determine an average rate of inflation in property values.
Table 2 shows clearly that much of the apparent growth in business taxable 
value in Kalamazoo County is due to the effects of inflation, however 
measured.[16] The three general price indices frequently indicate negative 
real growth in business property values. Even the Kalamazoo County Property 
Price Index, which is consistently lower than the other indices[17], shows that 
about three-fourths of the growth in business taxable value countywide is due 
to inflation.
Of course, price indices may contain errors. It is also true that to some 
degree the use of a price index depends on one's perspective. If you are
16. This same conclusion was reached recently in a study of statewide property 
values. See Heideman (1985: 3).
17. All of the price indicators are highly correlated with each other even 
though the local index shows lower rates of inflation. For example, the simple 
correlation coefficient between the Kalamazoo Property Price Index and the 
Consumer Price,Index for Detroit is .9343. The simple correlation coefficients 
of other pairs are even higher.
Table 2
ACCOUNTING FOR THE EFFECTS OF INFLATION IN THE GROWTH 
OF THE BUSINESS TAX BASE IN KALAMAZOO COUNTY
Year
Growth in 
Business 
Taxable 
Value
Consumer Price Index 
(Urban)
U.S.I Detroit2
GNP 
Price 
Deflator 
U.S. 3
Kalamazoo 
County 
Property 
Price 
Index4
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
9.0 
8.9 
9.2 
8.2 
8.9 
7.2 
6.9 
4.1 
6.2
6.5
7.7
11.3
13.5
10.4
6.1
3.2
4.3
3.6
6.8
7.6
12.7
15.9
9.3
4.0
2.8
4.4
3.5
5.8 
7.3 
8.5 
9.6 
9.6 
6.0 
3.8 
3.8 
2.9
4.4 
7.1 
9.9 
8.2 
9.0 
6.9 
3.4 
1.8 
1.6
1 Business Condition Digest , April 1985 and February 1986.
2 Monthly Labor Review, Various Issues.
3 Business Condition Digest, April 1985 and February 1986. 
* Kalamazoo County Equalization Office.
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interested in local government's ability to purchase public services for their 
residents, then one of the general indices is probably more appropriate. If 
you are interested in determining whether there have been physical increases in 
the value of property in the county (the bricks and mortar measurement), then 
the local property index is probably more appropriate. Keep in mind, however, 
that the Kalamazoo County Property Price Index is an average price index across 
all types of property and all local jurisdictions. Thus it does not truly 
capture the price increase for a particular class of property nor does it 
account for the possibility of differential rates of inflation across local 
jurisdictions.
The Kalamazoo County Property Price Index is utilized in this paper to 
account for the effects of inflation on the growth in the property tax base in 
Kalamazoo County and its local jurisdictions.[18] The inflation adjusted data 
are reported in Table 3 in exactly the same format as Table 1 to facilitate 
comparisons between the two sets of figures.
The inflation adjusted data in Table 3 provide a much more sobering picture 
of Kalamazoo County and its local jurisdictions. The inflation adjusted 
average growth rate in business property valuation countywide is 1.73 percent 
per year over the entire decade versus the 7.6 percent nominal growth rate 
reported in Table 1. More importantly, seven jurisdictions actually
18. This choice was relatively arbitrary, but it was deemed important to 
attempt to gauge the extent to which any real growth may have occurred in the 
property tax base itself.
Table 3
SUMMARY OF GROUTH RATES IN THE BUSINESS TAXABLE VALUE AND TOTAL TAXABLE VALUE, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION
Townships
Alano
Brady
Charleston
Cl iiax
Coistock
Cooper
Kalanaioo
Oshteno
Pavil lion
Prairie Ronde
Richland
Ross
Schoolcraft
Texas
Uakeshia
Cities
Galesburg
Kalaiazoo
Parchient
Portage
Business
Taxable
Value
(1976)
3,066,663
2i206il05
1)293.149
815,730
70,471i207
5,001,148
51,792,749
33,440,735
4,017,876
h261,008
4,907,167
4,345,745
12,473,647
2,554,461
729,250
2,.135,200
215)215,525
17,600,620
113,252,291
Business
Taxable
Value
(1985)
2)835,833
2,355,344
4,565,912
1,014,275
58,590,428
4,958,013
46,077,781
43 , 354 i 053
4,202,625
1,065,168
9,788,931
5,132,763
13,636,166
4,564,156
520)801
3,257,864
229,853,739
17,015,549
185,206,757
Absolute
Change
(1976-85)
(230,830)
149,239
3,272,763
198,545
(11,880,779)
(43,135)
(5,714,968)
9,913)318
184,749
(195)840)
4,881)764
787,018
1,162,519
2)009)695
(208,449)
1,122,664
14,638,214
(585,071)
71,954,466
Percent
Change
(1976-85)
-7.53
6.76
253.08
24.34
-16.86
-0.86
-11.03
29.64
4.60
-15.53
99.48
18.11
9.32
78.67
-28.58
52.58
6.80
-3.32
63.53
Average
Annual
Growth
Rate
-0.81 
0.73
15.05 
2.45
-1.75
-0.10
-1.17 
2.93 
0.50
-1.62 
7.97 
1.87 
0.99 
6.66
-2.83
4.81
0.73
-0.36
5.62
Total
Taxable
Value
(1976)
14,257,853
17,380,255
6,430)969
8)853)066
107)944,316
35,523,198
113,643,937
64,356,808
20,759,379
7,797,037
28,924,622
30,747,903
36,768,993
28,819,042
6,371,050
6,129,900
398,613,300
24,052,370
259,748,813
Total
Taxable
Value
(1985)
19,815,377
26,067,771
15,910,674
14,141,687
108,802,469
47,315,904
122,573,393
91,137,922
30,911,970
13,409,482
43,384,455
43,080,196
48,228,105
52,531,350
10,659,314
7,275,293
454,535,813
25,282,560
368,328,190
Absolute
Change
(1976-85)
5)557,524
8)687)516
7,479,705
5,288,621
858,153
11,792,706
8,929,456
26,781,114
10,152,591
5,612,445
14,459,833
12,332,293
11,459,112
23,7(2,308
4,286,264
1,145,393
55,922,513
1,230,190
108,579,377
Percent
Change
(1976-85)
38.98
49.98
68.72
59.74
0.79
33.20
7.86
41.61
48.91
71.98
49.99
40.11
31.17
82.28
67.31
16.69
14.03
5.11
41.60
Average
Annual
GroMth
Rate
3.72
4.61
7.31
5.34
0.09
3.24
0.84
3.94
4.52
6.21
4.61
3.82
3.06
6.90
5. 89
1.92
1.47
0.56
3.96
County Total 546i58Qi276 637,996,156 91,415,880 16.73 1.73 1,219,122,811 1,543,3?1,926 324,269,115 26.60 2.66
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experienced negative business growth over the period 1976 to 1985 — Alamo, 
Comstock, Cooper, Kalamazoo Township, Prairie Ronde, Wakeshma, and Parchment.
In general, the lack of business property growth in the county does not 
bode well for job growth in the region overall. It also indicates that if the 
inflation rates for provision of government services are actually higher than 
the inflation rates in property values, then many jurisdictions are finding it 
increasingly difficult to provide the same set of services without raising tax 
rates. Perhaps these results should not be surprising since population in the 
county has been stagnant for more than a decade.[19] But it is also indicative 
of how inflation can mask what is truly happening in an economy.
Effects of Property Tax Abatements
Local governments are authorized to grant property tax abatements under 
Michigan P.A. 198 for industrial facilities and P.A. 255 for commercial 
facilities.[20] Property tax abatements are an industrial tax incentive 
designed to spur new investment and thereby enhance regional economic 
development. Specifically through this program, firms can obtain a 50 percent
19. In Business Outlook, the Upjohn Institute tracks key economic indicators 
for Kalamazoo and other areas in Southwest Michigan. For the most recent 
population estimates, see Upjohn Institute for Employment Research (Winter, 
1986).
20. The authority to grant commercial property tax abatements expired 
December 31, 1985. The legislature is currently considering changes to and an 
extension of P.A. 255 authority.
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reduction in the taxes payable on new investment in plants and personal 
property or a 100 percent savings on rehabilitation projects, up to a maximum 
of 12 years. Commercial establishments are not permitted exemptions for 
personal property. Business firms must specifically apply for abatements and 
there are a number of restrictions to the granting of abatements.
The net effect of property tax abatements is to reduce the business 
property tax base. It should be mentioned, however, that property granted tax 
abatements is actually carried on separate tax rolls and technically pays a 
commercial facilities tax or an industrial facilities tax. This means, for 
instance, that the normal apportionment reports for Kalamazoo County and the 
State of Michigan, which detail property SEV, do not include any data 
whatsoever on property tax abatements. As mentioned earlier, commercial, 
industrial, and personal property SEV in this study have been adjusted to 
include the taxable value of business property currently granted special status 
under either P.A. 198 or 255, hence the term business taxable value. Thus, the 
data reported here may differ from those from other sources.
The taxable value of abatements and some related measures are presented in 
Table 4 for Kalamazoo County from 1977 through 1985. As might be expected, the 
growth in the taxable value of abatements was very rapid in the early years. 
As recently as 1981, this growth rate was a high 47 percent, probably due to 
the devastating tornado in downtown Kalamazoo in 1980. By 1985, the taxable 
value of property with tax abatements was almost $92 million, about 8.7 percent 
of business taxable value countywide or 3.6 percent of total taxable value. 
Although the growth of property tax abatements has been rapid in Kalamazoo
Table 4
Year
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
Taxable
Value of
Abatements
19,834,746
24,464,091
31,785,588
34,909,777
51,210,882
62,729,557
80,280,262
86,622,534
91,900,816
Percent
Change
23.34
29.93
9.83
46.69
22.49
27.98
7.90
6.09
Business
Taxable
Value
595,661,951
648,616,531
708,178,659
766,039,115
833,969,086
893,936,943
955,951,020
994,783,125
1,056,400,415
Abatements as
a Percent of
Business
Taxable
Value
Abatements as
a Percent of
Total Total
Taxable Taxable
Value Value
3.33
3.77
4.49
4.56
6.14
7.02
8.40
8.71
8.70
1,329,511,877
1,456,555,034
1,655,338,989
1,842,945,039
2,068,687,397
2,270,347,518
2,386,554,453
2,456,057,343
2,555,563,785
49
68
92
89
2.48
2.76
3.36
3.53
3.60
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County, the relative importance of those abatements has not changed much in the 
last three years. It is not known whether this recent stability is a precursor 
of the future or simply a temporary phenomenon.
The same data about abatements are reported for the local jurisdictions 
within Kalamazoo County in Table 5, but only for one year — 1985. In other 
words, this table provides a current snapshot of the distribution of property 
tax abatements across the local jurisdictions. The picture that emerges is 
that there is considerable variation in the relative importance of property tax 
abatements across local jurisdictions. Over 40 percent of business taxable 
value in Charleston is accounted for by the taxable value of abatements, most 
of that to a single firm — Eaton Corporation. At the other extreme, four 
local districts with small business taxable value have granted no property tax 
abatements whatsoever.
There appears to be considerable variation in the distribution of 
abatements across the larger districts as well. The taxable value of 
abatements constitutes almost 13 percent of business taxable value in Kalamazoo 
City, about 8 percent in Portage and Kalamazoo Township, 3 percent in Comstock, 
and 1 percent in Oshtemo. It is not known how much of these differences can be 
accounted for by the lack of growth in business taxable value (remember 
abatements are available only for new investments), the willingness of local 
jurisdictions to grant abatements, or the aggressiveness of firms in seeking 
abatements.
Table 5
PROPERTY TAX ABATEMENTS IN LOCAL JURISDICTIONS OF KALAMAZOO COUNTY, 1985
Taxable
Value of
Abatements
(1985)
Business
Taxable
Value
(1985)
Abatements as
a Percent of
Business
Taxable
Value
Total
Taxable
Value
(1985)
Abatements as
a Percent of
Total
Taxable
Value
Townships
Alamo
Brady
Charleston
Climax
Comstock
Cooper
Kalamazoo
Oshtemo
Pavillion
Prairie Ronde
Richland
Ross
Schoolcraft
Texas
Wakeshma
0
187,070
3,150,708
5,600
2,830,197
370,352
5.736,700
827,525
546,950
0
1,677,309
280,139
507,600
935,975
0
4,695,600
3,900,002
7,560,282
1,679,446
97,014,617
8,209,527
76,296,050
71,786,075
6,958,749
1,763,716
16,208,610
8,498,880
22,578,900
7,557,375
862,348
0.00
4.80
41.67
0.33
2.92
4.51
7.52
1.15
7.86
0.00
10.35
3.30
2.25
12.38
0.00
32,810,500
43,163,277
26,345.053
23,415,946
180,156,217
78,346,147
202,958,250
150,907,083
51,184,349
22,203,554
71,836,415
71,332,619
79,856,579
86,981,935
17,649,798
0.00
0.43
11.96
0.02
1.57
0.47
2.83
0.55
1.07
0.00
2.33
0.39
0.64
1.08
0.00
Cities
Galesburg
Kalamazoo
Parchment
Portage
49,146,894
1,315,597
24,382,200
5,394,403
380,594,119
28,174,516
306,667,200
0.00
12.91
4.67
7.95
12,046,503
752,624,944
41,863,116
609,881,500
0.00
6.53
3.14
4.00
County Total 91.900,816 1,056,400,415 8.70 2,555,563,785 3.60
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Measures of Fiscal Disparities
Before proceeding to a discussion of the Minnesota Plan for tax base 
sharing, it is important to ascertain whether fiscal disparities actually exist 
in Kalamazoo County. After all, it is the differing capabilities of local 
governments to raise revenue that is one of the prime factors motivating the 
consideration of tax base sharing. These measures of fiscal disparities will 
then be used in the simulations that are presented later in this paper.
Fiscal disparities in the Minnesota Plan refer to the question of differing 
tax capacities across local jurisdictions. There is no consideration of the 
bundle of services actually provided by governmental units, the efficiency with 
which they provide those services, or the degree to which they can tap other 
sources of revenue. Moreover, economists and others have pointed out that 
certain populations, such as the elderly, may require more governmental 
services than other groups. The logical implication is that even equal tax 
capacity may not provide local governments with equal abilities to meet the 
needs of their residents.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to address any of the aforementioned 
issues. The discussion is limited to the notion of fiscal disparities as 
developed within the context of the Minnesota Plan — the ability of local 
governments to raise revenue irrespective of the characteristics of their 
populations or other fiscal matters.
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Various measures of fiscal disparities are shown in Table 6. Where 
appropriate, each has been stated in per capita terms and related to the 
countywide average for that variable. Specifically, an index number is created 
as the local jurisdictional value for a variable divided by the countywide 
average for that same variable times 100. Thus an index number of 110 means 
that the locality is 10 percent above the countywide average for the variable 
in question. It should be clear that the concept of fiscal disparity is a 
relative one -- in this instance relative to some countywide average and stated 
in per capita terms so that comparisons across jurisdictions of different size 
and composition are meaningful.[21]
Kalamazoo County appears to be no exception to the hypothesis maintained in 
the introduction to this paper that business firms tend to concentrate in a few 
jurisdictions. In 1985, business taxable value per capita in the county was 
$4,974 but actually ranged from a low of $627 in Wakeshma to a high of $15,506 
in Parchment. In other words, across the 19 basic tax collection units in 
Kalamazoo County, business taxable value per capita is almost 25 times greater 
in the highest jurisdiction than in the lowest jurisdiction.
It is also interesting to note that there are only four jurisdictions -- 
Comstock, Oshtemo, Parchment, and Portage -- where business taxable value per
21. It is not necessarily obvious what common denominator should be-used in 
these comparisons — population, number of families, school pupils, electrical 
hookups, etc. However, population is undoubtedly the most frequently used 
measure.
Table 6
MEASURES OF FISCAL DISPARITIES, 1985
Population 
(1980)
Percent
of County
Total
Per
Capita 
Income 
(1981)
Indexed
to County
Average
Total
Taxable Value
per Capita
(1985)
Indexed
to County
Average
Business
Taxable Value
per Capita
(1985)
Indexed
to County
Average
Townships
Alamo
Brady
Charleston
Climax
Comstock
Cooper
Kalamazoo
Oshtemo
Pavllllon
Prairie Ronde
Rlchland
Rosa
Schoolcraft
Texas
Wakeshma
2,909
3,852
1,748
1,978
11,162
8,434
20,942
10,958
4,811
1,189
4,677
4,747
6,435
5,643
1,375
1.37
1.81
0.82
0.93
5.26
3.97
9.86
5.16
2.27
0.56
2.20
2.24
3.03
2.66
0.65
8,006
9,038
9,853
8,071
8,528
8,759
8,917
9,841
8,558
7,793
11,260
11,824
8,909
10,364
7,610
89.04
100.52
109.59
89.77
94.85
97.42
99.18
109.45
95.18
86.68
125.24
131.51
99.09
115.27
84.64
11,279
11,205
15,072
11,838
16,140
9,289
9,691
13,771
10,639
18,674
15,360
15,027
12,410
15,414
12,836
93.73
93.12
125.25
98.38
134.13
77.20
80.54
114.45
88.41
155.19
127.64
124.88
103.13
128.10
106.67
1,614
1,012
4,325
849
8,692
973
3,643
6,551
1,446
1,483
3,466
1,790
3,509
1,339
627
32.45
20.35
86.95
17.07
174.73
19.57
73.24
131.70
29.08
29.82
69.67
35.99
70.54
26.92
12.61
Cities
Galesburg
Kalamazoo
Parchment
Portage
1,822
79,722
1,817
38,157
0.86
37.54
0.86
17.97
7,121
8,129
9,749
10,190
79.20
90.41
108.43
113.34
6,612
9,441
23,040
15,983
54.95
78.46
191.47
132.83
2,961
4,774
15,506
8,037
59.52
95.98
311.73
161.57
County Total 212,378 100.00 8,991 100.00 12,033 100.00 4,974 100.00
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capita exceeds the countywide average. Specifically, business taxable value 
per capita in Comstock is about 75 percent higher than the average for the 
county, Oshtemo 32 percent, Parchment 212 percent, and Portage 62 percent. 
Portage, Comstock, and Oshtemo are also noteworthy in that they are the area's 
second, third, and fifth largest districts absolutely in terms of population.
As might be expected, the range of total taxable value per capita across 
the county is far less than business taxable value per capita. But the range 
is still significant, varying by a factor of nearly 3.5. All four 
jurisdictions which had above average business taxable value per capita also 
have above average total taxable value per capita, but there are seven other 
districts which join them with an above average total taxable value per capita, 
namely Charleston, Prairie Ronde, Richland, Ross, Schoolcraft, Texas, and 
Wakeshma. These latter districts tend to be the more rural/suburban areas of 
the county.
Perhaps what is most startling about total taxable value per capita across 
the county is that Kalamazoo City, easily the largest jurisdiction absolutely, 
is very near the bottom in per capita total taxable value, actually 17th of 19 
jurisdictions. In contrast, the county's second largest jurisdiction, Portage, 
is 4th highest in per capita total taxable value. In percentage terms, 
Kalamazoo City is nearly 22 percent below the county average for total taxable 
value per capita, while Portage is almost 33 percent above the county average. 
Thus, the area's two largest jurisdictions stand in sharp juxtaposition to each 
other in total taxable value per capita.
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Perhaps the most frequently used measure of fiscal disparities is income 
per capita. The estimates of income per capita for local jurisdictions 
utilized in this paper are produced by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and play a 
key role in the distribution of monies from federal general revenue 
sharing.[22] The most recently available data, those for 1981, are shown in 
Table 6.
In general, there is a significant correlation of income per capita in the 
local jurisdictions of Kalamazoo County with total taxable value per 
capita.[23] It may seem logical that a measure of wealth (property values) 
would be closely related to a measure of income, but it is not necessarily true 
in some metropolitan areas of the U.S. There are also some exceptions in 
Kalamazoo County. For instance, Comstock is third highest in total taxable 
value per capita, but only twelth highest in income per capita. Stated 
differently, Comstock is about 5 percent below the county average in income per 
capita, yet about 34 percent above average in total taxable value per capita. 
In this instance, it turns out that Comstock's high total taxable value per 
capita is due to its relatively large business tax base, which itself is 
dominated by the large GM/BOC stamping plant located in that jurisdiction.
22. The future for these data are uncertain since federal general revenue 
sharing is slated to end in 1986.
23. The simple linear statistical correlation coefficient of income per capita 
and total taxable value per capita is .5005.
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Table 6 also shows the population of the local jurisdictions and its 
distribution in percentage terms across the county. These data are reported 
here because this simple distribution of population can itself be used to 
determine the size of each jurisdiction's allocation from the shared tax base. 
Population is the least redistributive of all fiscal disparities measures 
because it assumes that every person should receive the same dollar amount of 
revenue. Other measures of fiscal disparities such as total taxable value per 
capita and income per capita further modify strict per capita shares by the 
degree to which income or property values are above or below average.
It should be noted that Kalamazoo City has about twice as many people as 
Portage and that these two jurisdictions combined account for over 55 percent 
of the population of the county. Together with Kalamazoo Township, Comstock, 
and Oshtemo, the only other districts with populations over 10,000, these five 
districts jointly account for over three-fourths of the population in the 
county.
In brief, there does seem to be some reason to think that fiscal 
disparities exist among the local jurisdictions in Kalamazoo County, as 
indicated by the extremely wide variation in business taxable value per 
capita. The variation in total taxable value and income per capita are much 
less but still significant. These results thus suggest that localities in 
Kalamazoo County do indeed differ in their ability to provide public services 
to their residents.
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III. Minnesota Plan
The purpose of this section is to gain a more detailed understanding of the 
Minnesota Plan and to apply its provisions to the local jurisdictions in 
Kalamazoo County. Some brief historical information is presented first to 
provide some background about passage of tax base sharing in the Twin Cities 
area and the legal challenges to it. Then the mechanics of the plan are 
discussed, followed by the empirical simulations.
Background
In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the residents of the Twin Cities 
area were sensitive to the existence of fiscal disparities. A few years before 
there had been a major debate about a proposed power plant site on the St. 
Croix River.[24] Environmentalists and others opposed the project, largely on 
the grounds the river was the most scenic in the region and served as a 
recreational playground for the entire seven county area. On the other hand, 
the county and local jurisdictions in which the plant was to be located were 
strong supporters of the project because it would add substantially to their 
property tax base. These officials publicly suggested that they might be 
willing to let the St. Croix remain undeveloped if they were compensated by 
other districts for doing so, perhaps by receiving a share of the growth in the 
tax base of those districts. (Gilje, 1977: 38)
24. The federal government has since designated the St. Croix a "wild and 
scenic river."
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The power plant was eventually built. As a result, the local jurisdiction 
in which the plant was located became the richest in the region, enjoying a per 
capita property tax base more than seven times higher than the regional 
average. (Kari and Knaff, 1982: 9)
A few years later Representative Charles Weaver, representing the northern 
suburbs of the Twin Cities area, became concerned that his districts had 
limited commercial-industrial growth potential. At that time the Twin Cities 
area was growing more to the west and south. He supported a Citizens League 
study of fiscal disparities out of which came the actual proposal for tax base 
sharing. The Citizens League, a private, nonpartisan public affairs 
association, became (and continues to be) a strong proponent of tax base 
sharing.
Another key actor in the passage of tax base sharing in the Twin Cities 
area was the Metropolitan Council, a regional planning agency authorized by the 
Minnesota legislature in 1967. The council was especially concerned with 
relieving the pressures of tax competition and the concomitant costs of 
unplanned growth in the region. According to their estimates, by 1990 the 
region would spend over $2 billion on unneeded public infrastructure unless 
there was more orderly urban development. In their view, tax base sharing 
would enhance economic growth and development by providing incentives for more 
rational growth management policies.
Tax base sharing was introduced in the Minnesota legislature in 1969 and 
eventually passed in 1971. Thereupon, the legality of the law was immediately
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challenged by Burnsville with the support of Bloomington. These districts 
expected to have rapid commercial-industrial growth in the years ahead and were 
therefore likely candidates to be net contributors of tax base under the 
sharing arrangement. The basis of their challenge was the uniformity clause of 
the Minnesota Constitution which requires equal taxation across classes of 
property and forbids the taxation of one district to benefit another. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, while admitting that the 
plaintiff's arguments had some merit, found that the various jurisdictions 
within the Twin Cities area were socially and economically interdependent. 
Therefore, the traditional interpretation of property tax law was 
inappropriate. In sum, the sharing of tax base was justified because those 
localities with the greatest commercial-industrial growth (the potential 
losers) also benefited from other communities through their hospitals, schools, 
roads, parks, housing, etc.
With the conclusion of this legal challenge, tax base sharing finally 
became operational in 1975. Surprisingly, there have been few changes to the 
law since its inception, but that is not to say that tax base sharing has 
escaped controversy. The law was challenged once again in 1980 without success 
(Baker and Hinze, 1984: 6), and some districts who are net contributors of tax 
base under the plan continue to be vocal critics. Nevertheless, besides the 
contentiousness that appears to always surround tax issues, it is probably fair 
to conclude that the majority of districts and residents support tax base 
sharing in the Twin Cities area.
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How the Plan Works
A conceptual description of the Minnesota Plan is presented in this 
section. Some readers may need/want more detail about the mechanics of tax 
base sharing than provided here. In Appendix A, a step-by-step application of 
the Minnesota Plan for tax base sharing is presented for a single tax year. 
This example utilizes data from the local jurisdictions in Kalamazoo County. 
In Appendix B, a technical description of the contribution and distribution 
formulas can be found.
Tax base sharing in the Twin Cities area encompasses seven counties and 195 
basic tax collection units. Together with school districts, water districts, 
etc., there are actually about 300 taxing jurisdictions, many of which 
obviously overlap the boundaries of the basic tax collection units. All of 
these jurisdictions participate in tax base sharing.
Although the large number of overlapping tax districts greatly complicate 
the bookkeeping system required to support tax base sharing, the system remains 
simple conceptually. The overlapping governments contribute and receive tax 
base depending on the growth that occurs within their boundaries. The county 
auditors, with the help of the basic tax collection units, perform the 
allocations of tax base for the overlapping jurisdictions. While Minnesota 
does not have a property tax abatement law, it does have tax increment 
financing districts. Since 1979, tax increment financing districts have been 
included in the shared tax base.
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It is the total net growth in the commercial-industrial tax base which is 
shared in the Minnesota Plan, including the effects of new construction, 
reassessments, and inflation. There is absolutely no attempt to determine 
which property is physically new or obsolete. Since the state specifically 
exempts personal property from its property tax system generally, it is not 
eligible for inclusion in tax base sharing.
In the Minnesota Plan, 40 percent of the growth in the commercial- 
industrial property tax base since 1971 is shared. That means the contribution 
of tax base to the regional pool is cumulative. Each year the district 
compares its current commercial-industrial tax base with the base that existed 
in the benchmark year of 1971, then takes 40 percent of the difference as its 
contribution to the areawide pool. If the growth of a district has been 
negative since the benchmark year, then it contributes nothing to the regional 
pool. However, it still remains eligible to receive a distribution of tax base 
from the regional pool.
In the Minnesota Plan, all of the contributions to the areawide pool are 
redistributed back to the various governmental units. The distribution is 
based upon population and fiscal capacity. Fiscal capacity is measured as the 
total value of all property within the jurisdiction divided by its population 
relative to the same measure for the entire region. In actual operation a 
distribution index is calculated as two times the local area's population 
multiplied by the ratio of the areawide tax capacity to the local tax capacity.
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The net effect of this distribution index is that local jurisdictions are 
allocated shares modified inversely by the total tax base per capita locally 
relative to the average tax base per capita in the region.[25] The implication 
is that a jurisdiction with a lower than average property tax base per capita 
will receive a higher than average share from the regional pool. For example, 
a locality that is 10 percent below average in property tax base would receive 
about a 10 percent above average distribution of tax base from the shared 
pool. A limiter is included in the Minnesota Plan so that jurisdictions with 
much higher than average property tax bases per capita (more than two times the 
regional average) are guaranteed a minimum distribution index equal to their 
population.
In the Minnesota Plan it is tax base which is shared, so the contribution 
and distribution of shared base must precede the budget setting cycle. Local 
jurisdictions then independently determine the size and composition of their 
spending and derive the mi 11 age rate. The tax base for these calculations 
includes the unshared portion of the local property tax base plus the 
distribution received from the regional pool. This implies that each 
jurisdiction determines one mi 11 age rate for all property, shared and unshared, 
just as it does now. The product of the local mi 11 age rate times the 
distributed share is the actual claim which a district has on the regional 
pool.
25. For more technical details about the distribution index, see Appendix B.
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Thus, in establishing their budgets, localities must treat the distribution 
from the regional pool in the same way as they treat all other property in the 
district. Consequently, one might say that "raiding" the regional pool is 
limited to the willingness of a jurisdiction to tax its own local taxpayers in 
the same manner as those nominally represented in the regional pool.
The actual tax rate levied on business property, however, is more 
complicated than the aforementioned local rate levied on all other classes of 
property. Firms pay the local rate of their jurisdiction on the unshared 
portion of business property and a regionwide shared rate on business property 
contributed to the regional pool. The regionwide average rate is determined by 
summing the claims on the regional pool, as described previously, and then 
dividing by the total value of property in the regional pool. For example, if 
a local jurisdiction has contributed 20 percent of its commercial-industrial 
tax base to the regional pool, then all firms in that locality pay the 
regionwide average rate on 20 percent of their property and the local rate on 
the remainder.
This approach insures that there is exactly enough revenue in the regional 
pool to meet the claims on the regional pool. Notice that, in effect, 
businesses pay a composite tax rate. This composite tax rate is applied to all 
businesses, not just those with increased valuations. Each firm is treated as 
if it had the average experience for that district. To do otherwise would 
create an administrative nightmare.
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As time passes, the size of the shared base grows. That in turn means the 
taxes which businesses pay will become more and more equalized, since they will 
be more dependent on the regional pool. Since 40 percent of the growth in the 
commercial-industrial tax base is contributed to the pool, then at the maximum 
40 percent of its tax rate can be dependent on the pooled base. This pooling 
of business tax rates in the Minnesota Plan must necessarily reduce the range 
of variation in business tax rates across the region.
The Minnesota Plan for tax base sharing is simple conceptually but somewhat 
difficult to follow in terms of the mechanics of the plan. It is definitely 
much more complex operationally than the current property tax system and 
requires tax administrators to keep a more complicated set of records. Perhaps 
it should be reiterated that the Minnesota Plan is not the only plan for tax 
base sharing but it has become the benchmark on which to evaluate other tax 
base sharing schemes.
Kalamazoo Simulations of the Minnesota Plan
In this section, the Minnesota Plan for tax base sharing is applied to the 
local jurisdictions of Kalamazoo County. The data base for these simulations 
was introduced in Section II. The 19 townships/cities which constitute the 
basic tax collection units in the county are used exclusively in these 
simulations. Villages, school districts, and other overlapping jurisdictions 
are not separately examined in this preliminary study, but that should not
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obscure the fact that such overlapping jurisdictions can be included in any tax 
base sharing pi an.[26]
Thus, these simulations illustrate the impacts of tax base sharing on 
townships/cities only in Kalamazoo County. For this initial simulation, the 
tax base is defined much like the Minnesota Plan. Personal property is 
excluded, but property tax abatements are included (except those for personal 
property). The tax base reflects all sources of growth, including inflation. 
The effects of inflation and property tax abatements are examined further later 
in the paper.
A base year of 1979 is utilized in this initial simulation. Although the 
choice of a base year is arbitrary, the goal was to select a relatively recent 
year to better reflect more recent growth trends, but not so recent that the 
regional pool is negligible. An alternative base year, 1981, is examined 
later.[27] The tax rates for this simulation were obtained from the Kalamazoo 
County Equalization Office. For several districts the rates were adjusted to 
include special assessments for police and fire.[28]
26. It should be clear that the exclusion of overlapping jurisdictions 
significantly reduces the computational requirements for this study.
27. 1981 is the first year in which Michigan required equalization by class of 
property. In earlier years, one equalization factor was applied to all classes 
of property, whereas separate factors are applied now. Thus the data set may 
be more consistent from 1981 to 1985.
28. Townships/cities obviously provide police and fire protection, but some 
jurisdictions pay for capital facilities through special assessments of real 
property for a specified number of years. For purposes of this research these 
special assessments have been included in local tax rates, but it is not clear 
if or how this would be done in an operational tax base sharing plan.
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The overall growth in the shared tax base since 1979 in Kalamazoo County is 
shown in Table 7. It illustrates an important feature of tax base sharing, 
namely, that it impacts an area slowly. The shared tax base is about 1 percent 
of total taxable value in 1980, rising to almost 4 percent by 1985. Since it 
is the business tax base that is actually shared, the total countywide pool 
represents a greater percent of business taxable value, growing from about 3 
percent to 12 percent over this six year span.
Although it is valuable to gain some insight about the steady growth of the 
shared pool, it is more important to examine the contributions and 
distributions of tax base made by the individual jurisdictions. The total 
shared pool countywide is identical whether viewed from the perspective of 
contributions or distributions, but the contribution of tax base by a single 
jurisdiction may differ from the distribution it receives. Remember that the 
contribution that a jurisdiction makes is a function of the growth in its 
business tax base but the distribution it receives is a function of population 
modified inversely by its fiscal capacity.
The contributions and distributions of tax base by the local jurisdictions 
are presented for a single tax year, 1985, in Table 8. Thus, this table and 
the two which follow, summarize the impacts of the Minnesota Plan for tax base 
sharing on the local jurisdictions in Kalamazoo County in its sixth year of 
operation. As stated earlier, the simulation uses historical data which may 
not be indicative of future growth rates. Such an approach also implies that 
tax base sharing, beyond imposition of the program itself, had no other effects 
in the county.
Table 7
EFFECTS OF THE MINNESOTA PLAN ON KALAMAZOO COUNTY
BASE YEAR = 1979
Growth in Areawide Tax Base
Business
Taxable
Value in
Year Shared Pool
1980 17,317,275
1981 34,424,162
1982 50,553,021
1983 64,378,784
1984 76,942,208
1985 86,209,786
Shared Pool
as a Percent
of Business
Taxable Value
3.26
6.00
7.98
9.93
11.32
12.27
Shared Pool
as a Percent
of Total
Taxable Value
1.08
1.90
2.51
3.10
3.59
3.92
Table 8
EFFECTS OF THE MINNESOTA PLAN ON THE LOCAL JURISDICTIONS 
IN KALAMAZOO COUNTY, 1985 (BASE YEAR « 1979)
Contributed 
Share to Pool
Townships
Alamo
Brady
Charleston
Climax
Comstock
Cooper
Kalamazoo
Oshtemo
Pavillion
Prairie Ronde
Richland
Ross
Schoolcraf t
Texas
Wakeshma
509,484
234,438
1,191,614
146,730
3,640,770
600,225
4,122,220
8,028,934
671,615
69,597
2,001,947
947,676
1,584,033
819,612
16,891
Contribution
as a Percent
of Business
Taxable Value
Distributed
Share
from Pool
20.03
18.04
32.18
14.00
5.91
15.61
8.44
13.96
17.51
15.11
17.47
16.47
11.46
18.54
6.64
1,090,113
1,444,707
536,631
678,185
3,400,663
3,797,348
9,869,062
3,471,149
1,901,991
267,145
1,287,772
1,297,543
2,300,158
1,499,961
438,154
580,629
1,210,270
(654,983)
531,456
(240,107)
3,197,123
5,746,842
(4,557,785)
1,230.376
197,547
(714,175)
349,867
716,125
680,349
421,263
Net Change in
Tax Base as
a percent of
Business
Taxable Value
Net Change
in Tax Base
per Capita
22.82
93.10
-17.69
50.70
-0.39
83.14
11.77
-7.93
32.07
42.88
-6.23
6.08
5.18
15.39
165.56
199.60
314.19
(374.70)
268.68
(21.51)
379.08
274.42
(415.93)
255.74
166.15
(152.70)
73.70
111.29
120.57
306.37
Cities
Galesburg
Kalamazoo
Parchment
Portage
497,646
19,815,220
1,190,854
40,120,280
11.96
7.77
9.19
19.08
1,212,365
40,029,706
489,314
11,197,816
714,720 
20,214,486 
(701,540) 
(28,922,464)
17.17
7.93
-5.41
-13.75
392.27
253.56
(386.10)
(757.99)
County Total 86,209,786 12.27 86,209,786 0.00 0.00
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Since 40 percent of the cumulative growth in the business tax base after 
1979 is contributed to the shared pool, the faster growing localities 
contribute more to the pool relative to their tax bases. Charleston, Alamo, 
Texas, Portage, and Pavilion, contribute from 18 to 32 percent of their 
business tax base to the pool compared to the 12 percent average for the 
county. In absolute terms the contributions of these jurisdictions tend to be 
small portions of the total shared pool because of their smaller business tax 
bases, i.e., high relative growth from a small absolute base. The lone 
exception is Portage which has experienced high relative growth from a much 
larger base. It contributes more than twice as much tax base to the regional 
pool as the second most important contributor, Kalamazoo City. Portage 
accounts for just under 47 percent of the shared pool in 1985, Kalamazoo City 
about 23 percent.
The distributions from the regional pool are a function of local population 
and fiscal capacity. Districts with higher than average fiscal capacity 
receive less tax base from the regional pool, just the opposite for districts 
with lower than average fiscal capacity. Various measures of fiscal capacity 
were presented earlier in Table 6. In the Minnesota Plan, total taxable value 
per capita is utilized as the measure of fiscal capacity. Remember that this 
redistribution of tax base is designed to at least partially redress fiscal 
disparities, one of the key features of tax base sharing as discussed in the 
introduction to this paper.
It is perhaps more meaningful to examine the net change in tax base due to 
sharing, calculated as distributions minus contributions, than to look at the
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distributions in isolation (Table 8). The net change can be positive because 
of low growth in the business tax base, low fiscal capacity, or both. In 
similar fashion, a negative net change indicates a high business tax base 
growth, high fiscal capacity, or a combination of these factors. Six 
jurisdictions are net contributors of tax base — Charleston, Comstock, 
Oshtemo, Rich!and, Parchment, and Portage. Of those, Portage easily 
outdistances the others, losing nearly $29 million in tax base, about 14 
percent of business taxable value in Portage in 1985.
Of the 13 net recipients, on the other hand, Kalamazoo City is the largest 
absolutely. It adds about $20 million in tax base which is nearly 8 percent of 
its 1985 business taxable value. Other significant -gainers include Cooper and 
Kalamazoo Townships. Of course, some smaller jurisdictions do gain 
substantially from their own perspective. For instance, Wakeshma has the 
smallest business tax base per capita in the county and it experienced very 
little growth from 1979 to 1985, so it gains a whopping 165 percent increase in 
its business tax base due to sharing. Yet the net change in total taxable 
value per capita is only a little over $300. In fact, most of the per capita 
changes in the table appear to be very modest.
The overall picture which emerges from the analysis so far is that 
Kalamazoo County's two largest jurisdictions are affected very differently by 
tax base sharing. Although Kalamazoo City is absolutely the largest 
jurisdiction, its total taxable value per capita is below the regional average 
and historically it has been slower growing than average. On the other hand, 
Portage has above average total taxable value per capita and it is among the
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fastest growing districts in the county. This combination of factors tends to 
make Portage absolutely the largest net contributor to tax base sharing, while 
Kalamazoo City is the largest net recipient. Keep in mind that this result is 
perfectly in accord with the general objective of tax base sharing to partially 
redress fiscal imbalances.
Once the tax base has been redistributed, it remains to work out the 
revenue implications of tax base sharing. These effects are shown in Table 9. 
The tax payable without sharing is the local mi 11 age rate times the total 
taxable value. Notice that the Minnesota Plan does not consider the effects of 
revenue from other governmental sources or other types of taxes. The focus is 
strictly on the property tax base and the local revenue raised from that 
base.[29]
The new overall tax rate with sharing is simply the taxes payable without 
sharing divided by the sum of total taxable value without sharing plus the net 
change in total taxable value due to sharing (distributions minus 
contributions). Thus it is assumed that tax base sharing has no effect on 
local budgets. Obviously, if a program of tax base sharing were adopted, there 
would be no guarantee that localities would have the same budgets with sharing 
as without. It is even hoped, as mentioned earlier, that tax base sharing 
would affect decisionmaking in the region. Nonetheless, the assumption of
29. Conceptually there is no reason why tax base sharing could not be related 
to the size or composition of other revenue sources. Such a possibility, 
however, is not examined in this paper.
Table 9
TAX EFFECTS OF THE MINNESOTA PLAN ON THE LOCAL JURISDICTIONS 
IN KALAMAZOO COUNTY, 1985
Townships
Alamo 
Brady
Charleston
Climax
Comstock
Cooper
Kalamazoo
Oshtemo
Pavillion
Prairie Ronde
Richland
Ross
Schoolcraft
Texas
Wakeshma
Tax
without 
Sharing
30,659
40,563
21,440
20,010
649,227
69,713
1,667,336
353,270
47,999
16,982
95,813
91,772
71,101
87,887
13,431
Tax Rate 
without 
Sharing
1.0000
1.0000
0.9534
0.8782
4.4868
0.9423
9.5000
2.5857
0.9987
0.8125
1.4282
1.3380
1.0000
1.0482
0.7881
Overall
Tax Rate
with Sharing
0.9814
0.9710
0.9820
0.8582
4.4943
0.9033
9.1988
2.6749
0.9738
0.8049
1.4436
1.3312
0.9900
1.0398
0.7691
Composite
Business
Tax Rate
with Sharing
3.1817
2.9542
4.5171
2.4133
4.9363
2.6303
9.4324
3.9724
2.8984
2.4914
3.2822
3.0825
2.2479
3.0657
1.5125
Net Change 
in Taxes Due 
with Sharing
5,027
1,403 
13,734
1,174 
28,287
3,753 
(41,451) 
86,801
6,185
618
22,099
9,614 
16,680
8,249 
(135)
Net Change
in Taxes Due
per Capita
1.73 
0.36 
7.86 
0.59 
2.53 
0.45
(1.98) 
7.92 
1.29 
0.52 
4.73 
2.03 
2.59 
1.46
(0.10)
Cities
Galesburg
Kalaraazoo
Parchment
Portage
107,484
12,419,667
266,478
4,981,982
9.9390
19.8060
10.0000
9.7017
9.3229 
19.1875 
10.2704 
10.28O7
9.6390
18.6265
10.4263
10.6025
(5,347) 
(530,931)
9,226 
365,015
(2.93)
(6.66)
5.08
9.57
County Total 21,052,815 11.8130 0.00
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fixed budgets provides a point of reference, however artificial, for the 
evaluation of tax base sharing.
Given the assumption of fixed budgets, it is necessarily true that any 
locality experiencing a gain in tax base due to sharing will have a lower 
overall tax rate with sharing. This new overall tax rate with sharing is 
important because that is the tax rate which will actually be levied on all 
nonbusiness property and the unshared portion of local business property. 
Thus, tax base sharing very modestly impacts all tax rates in the region. 
Specifically, rates climb slightly in the six localities losing tax base 
because the same amount of local spending is spread over a smaller property tax 
base. Just the opposite is true for the gainers of tax base. In absolute 
terms, the change in mi 11 age rates seldom exceeds one-half mill.[30]
It should also be remembered that this new overall tax rate multiplied by 
the distributed share is equal to that locality's claim on the regional pool. 
Thus, if the residents of a local jurisdiction decide that they want few public 
services, then those same residents will also have only a small claim on the 
regional pool, even though they may be a net gainer of tax base. The bottom 
line is that a jurisdiction's claim on the regional pool is limited by the 
willingness of local taxpayers to pay the same mi 11 age rate that is assessed 
property nominally in the regional pool.
30. The tax rate in mills, sometimes referred to as the mi 11 age rate, is the 
taxes due per $1,000 of taxable value. Thus, a millage rate of one mill means 
that $1.00 of taxes is paid for each $1,000.00 of taxable value.
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As explained earlier, the composite business tax rate is a function of the 
local mi 11 age rate and the shared rate where the weights are determined by the 
jurisdiction's contribution of business tax base to the regional pool. In 1985 
the sum of the claims on the shared pool divided by the tax base in the pool 
results in a mi 11 age rate of 11.813. That is the shared rate applied to 
business property in the regional pool. For example, all businesses physically 
located in Galesburg would pay this shared rate on about 12 percent of their 
property, their contribution of business tax base to the regional pool, whereas 
they would pay the local rate of 9.3229 mills on the remainder. The net result 
is that firms in Galesburg would pay a composite rate of about 9.6 mills with 
sharing.
Since there is such a divergence of mi 11 age rates throughout the county, 
the change in business tax rates can be dramatic, particularly in the smaller 
jurisdictions which have low tax rates initially. In most of these situations, 
the change in tax rates easily exceeds 100 percent. Thus, tax base sharing 
tends to significantly reduce the range of business tax rates across a region 
by raising some and reducing others. This happens gradually over the years but 
there is no doubt that the Minnesota Plan, through the shared portion of the 
business tax rate, ultimately impacts business tax payers to a far greater 
extent than other taxpayers.
In evaluating tax base sharing, a logical question is the extent to which 
it actually eliminates fiscal disparities. As explained in the subsection on 
measures of fiscal disparity, differences in income per capita is one of the
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most commonly accepted measures of fiscal disparity. The Minnesota Plan for 
tax base sharing, however, utilizes another, total taxable value per capita. 
It turns out that in this simulation the correlation of either measure with the 
net change in the business tax base is moderately negative.[31 ] The negative 
relationship indicates that the net recipients of tax base sharing tend to be 
those districts with lower than average total taxable values or income, while 
the net contributors tend to be those districts with higher than average total 
taxable values or income. In other words, it confirms that tax base sharing 
does tend to equalize the tax bases across the individual jurisdictions, 
providing them with more equal capability to raise revenue.
It also turns out that the correlation of the net change in taxes due per 
capita with sharing (a measure of the revenue/cost effects of tax base sharing) 
is moderately positive.[32] This positive relationship means that taxes are 
increasing more in jurisdictions with higher than average per capita total 
taxable value or per capita income. Thus, whether viewed from the perspective 
of changes in tax base or changes in taxes payable, the Minnesota Plan for tax 
base sharing would alleviate fiscal disparities across the local jurisdictions 
in Kalamazoo County.
31. The simple statistical correlation coefficient of the net change in the 
business tax base per capita due to sharing with income per capita is -.5718, 
with total taxable value per capita without sharing, -.5054.
32. The simple statistical correlation coefficient of the net change in taxes 
due per capita with income per capita is .576, with total taxable value per 
capita without sharing, .559.
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But it is also interesting to note in Table 10 that there are eight 
districts with above average total taxable value without sharing, namely, 
Alamo, Brady, Climax, Prairie Ronde, Ross, School craft, Texas, and Wakeshma, 
which actually gain a small amount of additional tax base with sharing. This 
result occurs because it is growth in the business tax base which is shared, 
thus allowing districts with small business tax bases and little growth to 
benefit from sharing. However, almost all of these districts end up paying 
more taxes in spite of this favorable shift in tax base. The reason is that 
businesses in those districts must pay the shared rate on a portion of their 
property and that shared rate is much higher than local rates.
One practical problem highlighted by this simulation is that very few 
districts gain from tax base sharing. The net change in taxes payable is 
favorable (meaning that taxes due actually decline) only in Kalamazoo Township, 
Wakeshma, Galesburg, and Kalamazoo City. Unless jurisdictions embrace the 
notion of redressing fiscal imbalances and believe that regional cooperation 
has the potential to enhance economic growth throughout the area, it may be 
difficult to achieve a political consensus about tax base sharing.
In general, this simulation shows that tax base sharing would tend to 
equalize fiscal disparities across the local jurisdictions in Kalamazoo County, 
at least for the historical period analyzed. The results for future periods or 
other historical periods may be much different. Other possibilities for tax 
base sharing are examined now.
Table 10
REDUCTION IN FISCAL DISPARITIES DUE TO THE MINNESOTA PLAN FOR TAX BASE SHARING
Townships
Alamo
Brady
Charleston
Climax
Comstock
Cooper
Kalamazoo
Oshtemo
Pavillion
Prairie Ronde
Richland
Ross
Schoolcraft
Texas
Wakeshma
Cities
Galesburg
Kalamazoo
Parchment
Portage
Business Taxable Value per Capita 
Indexed to County Average
Net
without with Change 
Sharing Sharing in Index
26.43 
10.20 
64.01 
16.01
166.65 13.78  
70.48
158.57 
24.10 
11.71 
74.03 
36.64 
64.92 
23.67 
5.59
69.03
96.67
215.52
166.55
Total Taxable Value per Capita 
Indexed to County Average
Net
without with Change 
Sharing Sharing in Index
32.46
19.69
52.69
24.13
166.00
25.23
78.78
146.01
31.82
16.73
69.42
38.87
68.28
27.32
14.85
6.03
9.49
(11.32)
8.12
(0.65)
11.45
8.29
(12.57)
7.73
5.02
(4.61)
2.23
3.36
3.64
9.26
80.89
104.33
203.85
143.64
11.85 
7.66 
(11.67) 
(22.90)
101.65
101.56
124.08
111.10
125.03
84.60
80.83
120.25
96.35
169.54
138.35
139.36
106.57
143.31
119.54
57.25
75.86
141.45
129.80
103.58
104.59
120.47
113.69
124.82
88.26
83.48
116.24
98.82
171.14
136.87
140.07
107.64
144.47
122.49
61.03
78.31
137.73
122.49
1.93 
3.03
(3.61) 
2.59
(0.21) 
3.66 
2.65
(4.01) 
2.47 
1.60
(1.47) 
0.71 
1.07 
1.16 
2.95
3.78
2.45
(3.72)
(7.31)
Income
per Capita
Indexed
to County
Average
89.04
100.52
109.59
89.77
94.85
97.42
99.18
109.45
95.18
86.68
125.24
131.51
99.09
115.27
84.64
79.20
90.41
108.43
113.34
Net Change
in Taxes
Due per
Capita
1.73
0.36
7.86
0.59
2.53
0.45
(1.98)
7.92
1.29
0.52
4.73
2.03
2.59
1.46
(0.10)
(2.93)
(6.66)
5.08
9.57
County Total 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
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IV. Selected Alternatives to the Minnesota Plan
Since there are virtually unlimited numbers of alternatives to the 
Minnesota Plan for tax base sharing, it is possible to investigate only a few 
options in this brief evaluation. First, some minor modifications to the 
Minnesota Plan are made to account for the effects of inflation, to show the 
effects of changing the base year, and to change the distribution formula. 
Second, a major modification is made to the Minnesota Plan that utilizes local 
tax rates rather than a shared rate on business property in the regional pool. 
This plan appears to be consistent with the enabling legislation for tax base 
sharing proposed in Michigan House Bill 4859.[33] Third, a simulation of tax 
base sharing is conducted using local rates given the assumption that a new 
auto assembly plant were constructed in the county. Finally, several options 
are considered for establishing a regional economic growth and development 
fund. The distinctive feature of this last possibility is that a portion of 
the shared revenue pool is not redistributed back to the local jurisdictions 
but held in a separate fund to be used regionwide in support of regional 
economic growth and development.
Minor Modifications to the Minnesota Plan
Tables 11 and 12 look at some minor modifications to the Minnesota Plan for 
tax base sharing — changing the base year, adjusting for the effects of
33. House Bill 4859 was introduced by Mary Brown, Donald Gilmer, and Paul 
Wartner, all representatives of Kalamazoo County districts, Michigan House of 
Representatives. The bill is currently being considered by the House Taxation 
Committee.
Table 11
TAX BASE SHARING: SIMULATIONS FOR KALAMAZOO COUNTY 
BASED UPON VARIATIONS ON THE MINNESOTA PLAN
(Results for 1985 with 1979 as the Base Year)
Township/City
Net Change 
in Tax Base 
Due to Sharing
Nominal 
Growth
Net Change in Taxes Payable, 
Distribution Based Upon:
SEV per 
Capita 
(Minnesota 
Plan)
Income per 
Capita
Simple 
per Capita 
(Relative 
Population)
Net Change 
in Tax Base 
Due to Sharing
Adjusted for 
Inflation
Net Change in Taxes Payable, 
Distribution Based Upon:
SEV per 
Capita 
(Minnesota 
Plan)
Simple 
per Capita 
(Relative 
Population)
Alamo
Brady
Charleston
Climax
Corns tock
Cooper
Kalamazoo
Oshtemo
Pavillion
Prairie Ronde
Richland
Ross
Schoolcraf t
Texas
Wakeshma
Galesburg
Kalamazoo
Parchment
Portage
580,629
1,210,270
(654,983)
531,456
(240,107)
3,197,123
5,746,842
(4,557,785)
1,230,376
197,547
(714,175)
349,867
716,125
680,349
421,263
714,720
20,214,486
(701.540)
(28,922,464)
5,027
1,403
13,734
1,174
28,287
3,753
(41,451)
86,801
6,185
618
22,099
9,614
16,680
8,249
(135)
(5,347)
(530,931)
9,226
365,015
4,432
1,138
12,727
893
19,784
3,577
(32,285)
79,272
5,557
343
20,277
8,697
15,182
7,154
(306)
(3,243)
(461,142)
6,492
311,448
4,351
1,020
12,188
900
19,145
3,380
(34,239)
74,967
5,359
368
18,922
7,701
14,546
6,499
(244)
(1,811)
(414,208)
5,368
275,788
56,255
301,694
(660,376)
150,115
946,432
853,179
2,746,639
(1,132,563)
253,367
52,258
(461,822)
7,001
481,764
53,761
121,942
269,022
11,140,587
136,180
(15,315,434)
2,682
813
9,633
302
(4,219)
1,475
(25,691)
22,827
2,807
207
9,391
3,794
1,277
3,955
(95)
(2,446)
(216,799)
(1,355)
191,444
2,346
654
8,567
223
(5,609)
1,315
(22,177)
19,485
2,446
130
8,116
3,116
992
3,269
(121)
(1,280)
(175,855)
(2,037)
156,419
Total
Note: Contributions from tax base are calculated as 40 percent of the growth in the business tax base (real property), 
in the contribution rate has a sealer effect on the results, i.e., a 20 percent contribution rate reduces both 
contributions and distributions by 20/40, or 50 percent.
A change
Table 12
TAX BASE SHARING: SIMULATIONS FOR KALAMAZOO COUNTY 
BASED UPON VARIATIONS ON THE MINNESOTA PLAN
(Results for 1985 with 1981 as the Base Year)
Township/City
Net Change 
in Tax Base 
Due to Sharing
Nominal 
Growth
Net Change in Taxes Payable, 
Distribution Based Upon:
SEV per 
Capita 
(Minnesota 
Plan)
Income per 
Capita
Simple 
per Capita 
(Relative 
Population)
Net Change 
in Tax Base 
Due to Sharing
Adjusted for 
Inflation
Net Change in Taxes Payable, 
Distribution Based Upon:
SEV per 
Capita 
(Minnesota 
Plan)
Simple 
per Capita 
(Relative 
Population)
Alamo
Brady
Charleston
Climax
Corns took
Cooper
Kalamazoo
Oshtemo
Pavillion
Prairie Ronde
Rich land
Hoss
Schoolcraft
Texas
Hakeshma
Galesburg
Kalamazoo
Parchment
Portage
439,116
745,922
(629,104)
343,473
2,075,009
2,120,580
3,497,136
(3,080,362)
807,835
137,061
(391,903)
486,551
364,050
685,177
241,085
400,379
9,180,101
(300,551)
(17,121,555)
2,080
776
11,256
493
(9,179)
256
(25,532)
57,315
3,129
182
13,125
2,642
11,184
1,833
110
(2,982)
(292,270)
4,232
221,350
1,768
612
10,420
330
(12,663)
274
(19,832)
52,237
2,770
24
11,988
2,275
10,161
1,357
(10)
(1.647)
(250,770)
2,637
188,069
1,748
539
9,975
342
(12,172)
216
(21,097)
49,359
2,664
46
11,146
1,764
9,717
1,056
22
(750)
(222,589)
1,987
166,027
161,011
273,595
(643,251)
143,688
809,945
900,560
2,272,519
(1,491,316)
292,447
60,755
(297,001)
292,147
200,809
348,623
90,835
157,861
7,063,468
116,541
(10,753,238)
938
513
9,226
75
(3,614)
(795)
(21,098)
25,952
1,498
(17)
6,882
(207)
3,663
(268)
82
(1,241)
(156,764)
(1,160)
136,335
791
395
8,201
27
(4,806)
(718)
(18,177)
22,388
1,281
(62)
5,904
(427)
3,146
(475)
43
(323)
(124,584)
(1,745)
109,142
Total
Note: Contributions from tax base are calculated as 40 percent of the growth in the business tax base (real property), 
in the contribution rate has a sealer effect on the results, i.e., a 20 percent contribution rate reduces both 
contributions and distributions by 20/40, or 50 percent.
A change
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inflation, and utilizing two other distribution formulas. The results for the 
1985 tax year using the 1979 base year are reported in Table 11, those for a 
1981 base year in Table 12. These summary tables only report the net change in 
tax base and taxes payable. The Minnesota Plan results are included as well to 
facilitate comparisons with that plan.
As could be expected, adjusting for the effects of inflation significantly 
reduces the size of the regional pool to be shared, by 72.2 percent using the 
1979 base year or by 61.1 percent using the 1981 base year. Although not shown 
in the tables, five districts would be zero contributors of tax base after six 
years of operation of the plan. Those districts are Comstock, Kalamazoo 
Township, Wakeshma, Kalamazoo City, and Parchment. Remember that under tax 
base sharing, if growth has been negative since the base year, then that 
locality's contribution of tax base is zero. These results reflect the fact 
that the business tax bases of some districts in Kalamazoo County have not 
exceeded the rate of inflation, at least since 1979.
It should be mentioned that the Kalamazoo County Property Price Index was 
used throughout this analysis. Since that index increased less than the other 
potential inflation indices discussed in Section II, that means the 
substitution of any of the other indicators would reduce the regional pool even 
further. As suggested earlier, in real terms it does not appear as if there 
has been much growth in the business tax base in Kalamazoo County for a 
considerable number of years.
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There are also a number of interesting changes in the results caused simply 
by changing the base year. For instance, Comstock becomes a gainer of tax base 
using 1981 as the base year; it also pays less tax. This may seem surprising 
since it was shown earlier that Comstock has well above average total taxable 
value and business taxable value relative to the county as a whole. But it 
must also be remembered that it is the growth in the tax base which is shared. 
So what these results imply is that the growth in the business tax base of 
Comstock has been below average since 1981. Again, any growth sharing plan 
will tend to benefit slow growing districts. A logical corollary is that the 
selection of a base year is not a trivial matter with tax base sharing.
Since total taxable value may not be a perfect measure of fiscal 
disparities, two other measures are used here, income per capita and relative 
population. All three measures tend to redistribute tax base, but population 
alone is the least redistributive. The notion of using relative population in 
a distribution formula is simply that each district receives a share of the 
regional pool based strictly upon its population, treating all residents 
exactly alike. Total taxable value and income per capita go beyond that, on 
the other hand, by modifying the population shares to the extent that income or 
total taxable value varies across the county. These matters were discussed 
earlier in the last part of Section II.
Thus, it should come as no surprise that using relative population in the 
distribution formula results in the least amount of redistribution across the 
local jurisdictions. The gains/losses are all reduced, save one, when
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comparing the relative population approach to either the Minnesota Plan (total 
taxable value per capita) or income per capita. Therefore, if the goal is to 
reduce somewhat the amount of redistribution, then simple relative population 
may be one alternative to consider in distributing the shared pool under a 
program of tax base sharing.
Except as noted, the differences in all of these alternative simulations 
tend to be ones of degree rather than changes in absolute direction. It might 
be said that the results tend to confirm those of the Minnesota Plan. That 
should not be surprising since only minor modifications were made to the 
Minnesota Plan. But neither should it rule out the possibility of other plans 
and other simulations. We turn our attention now to some simulations that 
represent a significant departure from the Minnesota Plan for tax base sharing,
Tax Base Sharing Using Local Tax Rates
One of the major characteristics of the Minnesota Plan is that businesses 
pay a shared or regionwide average tax rate on business property nominally in 
the regional pool. As time passes and the regional pool grows, the shared 
portion of the tax also grows. The implication is that over time business tax 
rates converge toward the regional average.
As pointed out earlier, this aspect of tax base sharing was legally 
challenged in Minnesota, and it would likely be challenged here if tax base 
sharing were adopted. Therefore, this section explores the impacts of 
eliminating the shared tax rate on business property. That means, in effect,
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that sharing takes place using local tax rates, thereby distributing the 
effects of tax base sharing equally across all taxpayers. This approach to tax 
base sharing appears to be more consistent with that proposed in Michigan House 
Bill 4859 than the Minnesota Plan.
The easiest way to understand this major alternative to the Minnesota Plan 
for tax base sharing is to look at an example of its application. That is done 
here for the broadest definition of the business property tax base possible in 
Michigan, that which includes personal property and any abatements 
thereon.[34] The reader interested in more detail about tax base sharing using 
local rates can consult Appendix C. It contains a step-by-step application and 
explanation of this approach rather than the more conceptual presentation of 
this section. A technical description of the distribution formula for tax base 
sharing using local rates can be found in Appendix D.
The tax base contributed to the regional pool in this approach is 
calculated in the same way as the Minnesota Plan, 40 percent of the nominal 
growth in the business tax base since the benchmark year. But the tax base is 
not shared as in the Minnesota Plan. The nominal contribution of tax base 
times the local tax rates constitutes the shared pool under this alternative 
plan. Therefore, tax revenues are shared rather than tax base. For this 
reason, the approach might be termed local revenue sharing rather than tax base 
sharing,
34. Other simulations were conducted but only the aforementioned is reported in 
this paper.
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although it remains true that the contribution of revenue to the pool is tied 
to the growth of the business tax base.
The method of distribution of revenues in the shared pool back to the 
localities also differs from the Minnesota Plan. In this simulation the 
redistribution is accomplished using the distribution formula of the federal 
general revenue sharing program. This approach may not be superior to others, 
but the federal formula does have the advantage of being found to be 
politically acceptable by the U.S. Congress after staff researchers 
experimented with hundreds of alternatives (Spencer, 1980: 152). The 
distribution of revenue is a function of population, income, and taxes 
payable. A technical description of the distribution formula is provided in 
Appendix D.
It should be mentioned that it is absolutely critical to add a measure of 
tax effort (taxes payable) because the contribution of revenues is calculated 
at local rates. This means that districts with high local tax rates contribute 
much more revenue to the shared pool than districts with low tax rates. 
Without the addition of a tax effort measure to the distribution formula, all 
of the higher than average tax districts lose substantially, while the smaller, 
lower tax districts are the primary beneficiaries.
The results of tax base sharing using local rates are shown in Table 13 
using 1979 as the base year. What becomes clear from looking at Table 13 is 
that the net change in taxes payable is favorable (meaning lower) for 14 of 19 
districts. This contrasts sharply with the Minnesota Plan where only four
Table 13
TAX BASE SHARING AS PROPOSED BY HOUSE BILL 4859
Contributed
Townships
Alamo
Brady
Charleston
Climax
Corns tock
Cooper
Kalamazoo
Oshtemo
Pavilllon
Prairie Ronde
Richland
Ross
Schoolcraft
Texas
wakeshma
Cities
Galesburg
Kalamazoo
Parchment
Portage
Tax Base
to Pool
665,884
466,836
2,365,107
207,608
7,935,912
926,488
4,983,630
10,684,344
988,135
156,091
2,785,600
1,281,398
2,446,668
1,208,724
37,726
795,327
38,838,318
3,429,747
59,085,160
Tax Rate
without
Sharing
1.0000
1.0000
0.9534
0.8782
4.4868
0.9423
9.5000
2.5857
0.9987
0.8125
1.4282
1.3380
1.0000
1.0482
0.7881
9.9390
19.8060
10.0000
9.7017
666
467
2,255
182
35,607
873
47,344
27,627
987
127
3,978
1,715
2,447
1,267
30
7,905
769,232
34,297
573,226
Distribution
Received
from Pool
2,302
2,376
1,163
1,419
49,975
4,327
109,031
18,116
3,138
1,336
3,638
3,070
4,524
3,817
1,080
10,616
1,014,284
19,805
256,214
Net Change in
Taxes Due
with Sharing
(1,636) 
(1,909)
1,092 
(1,237)
(14,368) 
(3,454)
(61,687) 
9,510 
(2,151) 
(1.209)
340
(1,355) 
(2,077) 
(2,550) 
(1,050)
(2,712) 
(245,052)
14,493 
317,012
Net Change in
Taxes Due
per Capita
Tax Rate
with Net Change 
Sharing in Tax Rates
(0.56)
(0.50)
0.62
(0.63)
(1.29)
(0.41)
(2.95)
0.87
(0.45)
(1.02)
0.07
(0.29)
(0.32)
(0.45)
(0.76)
0.9501
0.9558
0.9948
0.8254
4.4070
0.8962
9.1961
2.6487
0.9567
0.7581
1.4329
1.3190
0.9740
1.0189
0.7286
-0.0499
-0.0442
0.0414
-0.0528
-0.0798
-0.0441
-0.3039
0.0630
-0.0420
-0.0544
0.0047
-0.0190
-0.0260
-0.0293
-0.0595
(1.49)
(3.07)
7.98
8.31
9.7139
19.4804
10.3462
10.2215
-0.2251
-0.3256 
0.3462 
0.5198
County Total 139,288,702 1,510,231 1,510,231
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districts were net recipients. Of course, this conclusion and others to be 
drawn shortly should be tempered with the knowledge that the same fixed budget 
assumption is made here that was made with the Minnesota Plan. Similarly, it 
is also implicitly assumed that this program has no other effects on the area 
or its growth.
As a result of using a broader definition of the business tax base in this 
simulation than that which was used in the Minnesota Plan, namely, including 
business personal property and abatements thereon, the tax base available for 
sharing increases countywide from about $89 million to $139 million. The 
amount of revenue available for sharing also climbs significantly, from about 
$1.0 million to $1.5 million. Thus, this illustrates clearly the order of 
magnitude of the impacts that could be expected from adding business personal 
property to the shared pool.
In spite of this increase in shared revenues countywide, many of the 
absolute gains and losses for the individual jurisdictions are actually smaller 
with tax base sharing using local rates than with the Minnesota Plan. For 
instance, Portage pays only $317 thousand more taxes under this plan compared 
to $365 thousand more under the Minnesota Plan. In contrast, Kalamazoo City 
sees its gain (meaning less taxes payable) cut in half by tax base sharing 
using local rates. Perhaps this should not be surprising since revenue is 
contributed at local rates under this plan rather than the shared rate of the 
Minnesota Plan. Since Kalamazoo City easily has the highest rate, it 
contributes the largest revenue share to the pool, even though the growth in 
the business tax base in Kalamazoo City has been less than average. Although
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the distribution formula accounts for this greater tax effort, Kalamazoo's gain 
is still reduced. Kalamazoo's loss in this alternative approach to tax base 
sharing is what turns many of the other districts into small gainers.
As mentioned earlier, the magnitudes of the gains and losses appear to be 
small. Twelve of the 19 localities gain or lose less than one dollar of taxes 
per capita, and the net change in tax rates is usually less than five 
one-hundredths of a mill. Portage is absolutely the largest loser and sees its 
tax rates climb by about one-half a mill, while the largest gainer, Kalamazoo 
City, experiences about a one-third of a mill decline in rates.
A final question is whether or not tax base sharing using local rates tends 
to eliminate fiscal disparities. Remember that the goal is to provide 
additional revenue to districts with lower than average income or total taxable 
value per capita. With tax base sharing using local rates the correlation of 
the net change in taxes payable with either total taxable value per capita or 
income per capita is moderately positive.[35] This result is much like that of 
the Minnesota Plan; it shows that tax base sharing using local rates would tend 
to redress fiscal imbalances.
Simulation of Auto Assembly Plant
Proponents of tax base sharing argue that sharing distributes the benefits 
of regional economic growth more equally yet preserves the independence of
35. The simple statistical correlation coefficient of the net change in taxes 
payable per capita with total taxable value per capita is .638, with income per 
capita, .383.
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local governmental units. They also maintain that the location of future 
growth is so uncertain that jurisdictions are better off accepting a guaranteed 
share of the regional growth rather than simply going it alone. Perhaps one 
way to get a better perspective of the impacts of tax base sharing is to 
simulate the location of a single new firm in Kalamazoo County. It is 
well known that Kalamazoo County has been considered as the site for several new 
auto assembly plants. Such a major facility is therefore a logical candidate 
for this analysis, although it should be clear at the outset that the industry 
identification is immaterial to the tax analysis.
It is assumed that the auto assembly plant is built in Schoolcraft Township 
and became fully taxable in 1985. Although it is not known what the market 
value of such a facility might be, it is convenient to assume that the market 
value of the plant and equipment is $1 billion (land values are not considered 
in this illustration).[36] Since property taxes are payable in Michigan on 50 
percent of the market value of any class of property, that leads to a state 
equalized valuation of $500 million dollars.
Undoubtedly, such a new firm would apply for and likely receive a property 
tax abatement for the plant. Since it is a new facility rather than a
36. It is anticipated that the Mazda plant in Flat Rock, Michigan will have a 
market value of $300-400 million (Fulton, Grimes, and Baum, 1984: 31). The 
Chrysler-Mitsubishi plant in Illinois may be valued .in excess of $500 million. 
GM's investment in the Saturn project may exceed $5 billion, but it is not 
known how much of that will be plant and equipment at the production site.
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rehabilitation project, the maximum abatement award would effectively reduce 
the SEV by 50 percent, so the actual taxable value of the auto assembly plant 
would be $250 million. This $250 million would be defined as additional 
business taxable value in this paper.
It may be helpful at this point to get a brief overview of what this plant 
would mean for Kalamazoo County and School craft Township specifically. An 
increase of $250 million in business taxable value in 1985 represents nearly a 
24 percent gain in business taxable value or about a 10 percent gain in total 
taxable value for the entire county. That gain is obviously substantial, but 
the effects on School craft Township are truly huge by any standards. A net 
gain of business taxable value of $250 million exceeds the total taxable value 
of School craft Township by a factor just in excess of three. That means the 
plant alone would amount to more than three times the current taxable value of 
all property in School craft Township.
Such a change would have tremendous effects in Schoolcraft Township and 
lesser but still significant effects throughout the county. There would be new 
supplier firms, new housing, and new school enrollments, among others. But the 
focus of this simulation is strictly on the new primary facility, the auto 
assembly plant itself, and the impacts it would have on the local jurisdictions 
with and without tax base sharing.
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Without tax base sharing, Schoolcraft would capture all of the increase in 
tax base.[37] The local budget would undoubtedly increase, although to what 
extent is unknown. For this analysis, it is assumed that School craft's current 
mi 11 age rate of one mill is maintained with the addition of the new plant, 
probably as neutral an assumption as possible. It means that without sharing, 
Schoolcraft Township's local spending could increase by $250,000, again three 
times more than their current spending from the local property tax base.
With tax base sharing, the impacts would differ depending on the nature of 
the program adopted. But this simulation specifically looks once again at tax 
base sharing using local rates, emphasizing the net changes from the simulation 
discussed earlier in this section. Tax base sharing using local rates is not 
necessarily superior to other plans, but it may be more tractable politically 
and legally.
School craft's contribution of tax base to the shared pool grows by $100 
million with the new auto facility, 40 percent of the increase in business 
taxable value of $250 million. Given School craft's mi 11 age rate of one mill, 
it also means that $100,000 in revenue is added to the shared pool. 
Conversely, it should be noted that tax base sharing protects the other 60 
percent of the growth in the tax base. In other words, $150,000 is reserved 
exclusively for spending by Schoolcraft.
37. To the extent that the site already had improvements to the land, then that 
would reduce the net gain to Schoolcraft because that utilization would now 
become obsolete, for example agricultural buildings replaced by the auto. It 
is likely that these effects would be small compared to the valuation of the 
new plant.
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It might be argued that Schoolcraft somehow "cannot afford" or "needs" the 
$100,000 contributed to the regional pool. Of course, that neglects the share 
of the regional pool which Schoolcraft itself will receive, but the 
distribution of the regional pool will be addressed momentarily. The question 
here is really one of fiscal capacity again.
Although no definitive answer is possible, the new auto assembly facility 
would easily make Schoolcraft Township the richest in the area. Its total 
taxable value would be nearly four times the county average. That means the 
population of Schoolcraft could double because of the new plant and yet it 
would still have a property tax base about two times higher than the regional 
average. It would also remain the richest district in the area. Furthermore, 
this simple example neglects the added property valuation that the increased 
population would bring to Schoolcraft. Proponents of tax base sharing would 
maintain that Schoolcraft does have the capacity to share tax base and revenues 
and even the obligation to do so since the plant will undoubtedly create many 
costs in other jurisdictions.
The distribution of the regional pool and the net change in taxes and tax 
rates are shown in Table 14. Only the changes arising from the new plant are 
shown in the table, so the distribution of revenue from the regional pool back 
to the local jurisdictions rises by $100,000, exactly the amount of additional 
revenue contributed to the shared pool by Schoolcraft. The distribution in 
this simulation is accomplished using the U.S. Senate three-factor distribution 
formula. It is interesting to note that School craft receives $15,215 of the 
increase in the shared pool. Thus, from Schoolcraft 1 s perspective it has only
Table 14
AUTO ASSEMBLY PLANT SIMULATION: 
TAX BASE SHARING USING LOCAL RATES
Distribution 
From
Regional 
Pool
Townships
Alamo
Brady
Charleston
Climax
Comstock
Cooper
Kalamazoo
Oshtemo
Pavillion
Prairie Ronde
Richland
Ross
Schoolcraft
Texas
Wakeshma
Net Change
in Taxes
Received
from Pool
New
Overall 
Tax Rate
130
134
66
80
2,814
244
6,139
1,020
177
75
205
173
15,215
215
61
130
134
66
80
2,814
244
6,139
1,020
177
75
205
173
(84,785)
215
61
-0
-0
-0
-0
-0
-0
-0
-0
-0
-0
-0
-0
0
-0
-0
.003950
.003100
.002486
.003413
.015620
.003110
.030250
.006760
.003452
.003387
.002852
.002423
.276751
.002471
.003445
Cities
Galesburg
Kalamazoo
Parchment
Portage
598
57,114
1,115
14,427
598
57,114
1,115
14,427
-0.049625
-0.075886
-0.026639
-0.023656
County Total 100,000
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lost the difference of its $100,000 contribution less its increased share 
received from the regional pool, or $84,785.
All of the other districts, of course, gain modestly from the location of 
the new facility in Schoolcraft. With tax base sharing using local rates, 
these gains are rather small — in large part because School craft's mi 11 age 
rate is so low. Notice that both higher than average and lower than average 
income or property tax base districts gain from sharing. Again, tax base 
sharing shares the growth in business taxable value regardless of where that 
growth occurs and all districts receive a guaranteed share of that growth; so a 
single increase of business taxable value such as that assumed here benefits 
all districts. Schoolcraft gained $165,215 (60 percent of growth in business 
taxable value plus their share of distribution from pool), while the other 
districts jointly shared $84,785.
Of course, it remains true that Schoolcraft could have gained even more by 
going it alone. But remember it did not truly know where future growth would 
occur in the county. More important, the notion of tax base sharing is that 
the new auto plant would create many costs beyond Schoolcraft and that the 
residents of Schoolcraft benefit from some of the public services provided by 
those jurisdictions. Advocates of tax base sharing would argue that 
Schoolcraft and the owners of the new plant would actually have a self-interest 
in seeing that the entire region grows and prospers, including other 
governmental units.
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In summary, this section explored the direct impacts of a major new 
industrial facility on Kalamazoo County without any sharing and with sharing 
using local rates. The impacts were small, in part because Schoolcraft has low 
local tax rates. But the simulation demonstrates how a program of tax base 
sharing might distribute the benefits of regional economic growth and 
development from a major new industrial plant. Without sharing, the local 
jurisdiction in which the plant locates captures all of the increase in taxable 
value, whereas sharing distributes at least some of the gains throughout the 
county.
Regional Economic Growth and Development Fund
In the options for tax base sharing discussed heretofore, all of the 
contributions to the shared pool were redistributed back to the local 
districts. The logical implication is that the shared pool is exhausted 
annually. Therefore, there is no possibility for the accumulation of funds in 
the regional pool.
It may be desirable, however, to consider establishing a modest regional 
economic growth and development fund. The maintained hypothesis of this paper 
throughout has been that the benefits and costs of economic development reach 
far beyond local jurisdictional boundaries. Thus, it is entirely possible that 
there may be joint spending that would enhance economic growth and development 
countywide, spending that would not likely be done otherwise because those 
costs (and subsequent benefits) are not captured by the individual localities. 
Since one of the goals of tax base sharing is to promote more regional thinking
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and cooperation, a regional economic growth and development fund might lend 
direct support to the achievement of that goal.
The monies in such a joint fund would be explicitly permitted to accumulate 
over the years. Any limitations on spending would have to be agreed upon in 
advance. But the idea is to approach economic development in a systematic way 
across the region. It is well known that development of local infrastructure 
can be critical in determining the success of an area. For instance, consider 
a major, new industrial facility once again. What would be the impact in the 
future if firms knew that local jurisdictions share tax base in order that all 
localities might be better able to support local spending? That residents 
think regional cooperation is so important that they have set aside a fund for 
regional economic growth and development? Would any preliminary planning 
studies or other research be helpful? Beyond any state spending/tax 
incentives, could a regionwide fund help in guaranteeing easy access to 
potential sites, providing for special education needs, or meeting other unmet 
needs?
It is far beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the spending options 
for a regional economic growth and development fund. It is certainly not 
necessary to attract a major, new industrial plant; there may be many other 
joint needs which far transcend those of a single industrial facility. In 
fact, one of the knottiest problems with such a regionwide fund might be 
deciding how to spend the monies. Suffice it to say here that some regions, 
including Minneapolis-St. Paul, have a much stronger and more formal regional 
development and planning focus than currently exists in Kalamazoo County. It
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is simply assumed here that there may be joint spending and/or planning not 
currently being done that might enhance regional economic growth and 
development.
Three possibilities for the establishment of a regional economic growth and 
development fund are explored briefly. First, a 10 percent holdback of 
revenues in the shared pool is considered as part of tax base sharing using 
local rates. This means that 10 percent of a jurisdiction's distribution is 
withheld and placed in a joint fund for future spending. Second, 10 percent of 
each jurisdiction's contribution could be held back from redistribution. Both 
options raise the same amount of money because the shared pool is identical 
whether viewed from the contribution or distribution side. But the costs to 
the local jurisdictions differ because an individual jurisdiction's 
contribution is not necessarily the same as its distribution. It should also 
be mentioned that this second option can operate independently of any tax base 
sharing program.[38]
Finally, a regional economic growth and development fund could be 
established with all jurisdictions contributing at the same millage rate times 
the total growth of the business tax base in that jurisdiction. This final 
plan differs from the others in breaking the connection to local rates. All
38. In a joint fund independent of tax base sharing, the same amount of revenue 
could be raised by taking local tax rates times 4 percent of the growth of the 
business tax base. The 4 percent figure is the same as 40 percent of the 
business tax base times a 10 percent holdback.
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business growth anywhere in the county would then be treated equally regardless 
of local rates or fiscal disparities. A mi 11 age rate of .434 is selected for 
this example because that rate raises the same amount of revenue in 1985 as the 
other options.
The growth of the regional economic growth and development fund countywide 
is presented in Table 15. The base year is assumed to be 1979. The aggregate 
results are identical in 1985 regardless of the specific plan used to determine 
the contributions by the individual jurisdictions. But it should be noted that 
the contributions at a constant mi 11 age rate would differ in earlier years. 
After six years of operation, the cumulative value of the fund assuming no 
spending whatsoever is a little more than one-half million dollars. The 
contribution in 1985 alone is $151,123.
There is no doubt that the regional economic growth and development fund is 
extremely small relative to total local governmental spending. But the 
maintained assumption, much like that of tax base sharing, is that it may be 
desirable for such a fund to grow slowly. The commitment of a portion of the 
future growth in the business tax base obviously leaves current spending 
untouched. If the residents of Kalamazoo County wish to see a faster growth or 
more immediate spending, then the contributions to the fund can be increased 
accordingly.
Table 16 summarizes the costs to the local jurisdictions of establishing a 
joint fund for regional economic growth and development for a single tax year, 
1985. The contribution and distribution of revenues from the simulation of tax
Table 15
GROWTH OF THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH 
AND DEVELOPMENT FUND
Annual
Increase Total
Year (10*) Amount
1980 22,954 22,954
1981 52,159 75,113
1982 85,862 160,975
1983 109,939 270,914
1984 124,358 395,272
1985 151,023 546,295
Table 16
COSTS TO LOCAL JURISDICTIONS OF REGIONAL ECONOHIC GROUTH AND DEVELOPHENT FUND
Tax Base Sharing Using 
Local Rates
1965
Alaio
Brady
Charleston
Cliiax
Coistock
Cooper
Kalaiazoo
OsKteio
Pavillion
Prairie Ronde
Richland
Rosi
Schoolcraft
Texas
Uakeshia
Cities
Galesburg
Kalaiazoo
Parchient
Portage
Taxes
Contributed
to Pool
666
467
2,255
182
35.607
873
47.344
27.627
987
127
3.978
1.715
2.447
1.267
30
7,905
769,232
34,297
573,226
Distribution
Received
froi Pool
2,302
2.376
1,163
1,419
49,975
4,327
109,031
18,116
3.138
1,336
3.638
3.070
4.524
3,817
1.080
10,616
1.014,284
19.805
256.214
Cost of Econoiic Development Fund
10 Percent 10 Percent Countywidt
Holdback froi Holdback froi Hillage Rate
Distribution Contribution (.434 •ills)
230
238
116
142
4,997
433
10,903
1,812
314
134
364
307
452
382
108
67
47
225
18
3,561
87
4,734
2,763
99
13
398
171
245
127
3
722
506
2.564
225
8,604
1.005
5.403
11.584
1.071
169
3.020
1.389
2.653
1.311
41
1,062
101,428
1,980
25,621
790
76,923
3,430
57,323
862
42,110
3,719
64,063
Cost of Econoiic Development Fund 
Per Capita
10 Percent 10 Percent Countynide
Holdback <roi Holdback froi Hillage Rate
Distribution Contribution (.434iills)
0.08
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.45
0.05
0.52
0.17
0.07
0.11
0.08
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.08
0.02
0.01
0.13
0.01
0.32
0.01
0.23
0.2S
0.02
0.01
0.09
0.04
0.04
0.02
0.00
0.25
0.13
1.47
0.11
0.77
0.12
0.26
1.06
0.22
0.14
0.65
0.29
0.41
0.23
0.03
0.58
1.27
1.09
0.67
0.43
0.96
1.89
1.50
0.47
0.53
2.05
1.68
Cost of Econoiic Development Fund 
At • Percent of Local Property Tax Receipts
10 Percent 10 Percent Countywide
Holdback troi Holdback froi Hillage Rate
Distribution Contribution (.434 lills)
0.70
0.55
0.46
0.69
0.62
0.59
0.57
0.46
0.61
0.74
0.35
0.32
0.57
0.42
0.78
0.20
0.11
0.90
0.09
0.44
0.12
0.25
0.71
0.19
0.07
0.39
0.18
0.31
0.14
0.02
2.20
1.17
10.21
1.09
1.06
1.36
0.28
2.97
2.10
0.94
2.94
1.46
3.32
1.44
0.29
0.89
0.68
0.47
0.43
0.66
0.52
0.82
0.97
0.72
0.28
0.89
1.08
County Total 1,359,208 1,510.231 151.023 151,023 151,023 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.60 0.60 0.60
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base sharing using local rates are also presented because those data help in 
explaining the costs of the fund. For instance, 10 percent of Alamo's 
distribution, $230, is withheld using the holdback from distribution method, 
$67 using 10 percent of its contribution, or $832 by simply using a constant 
mi 11 age rate.
These differences arise due to the structure of the plans themselves. For 
example, one of the consequences of the holdback of a portion of the 
distribution is that the net additional cost of establishing the joint fund is 
relatively greater for those districts slated to receive greater than average 
shares of the fund, lesser for those due to receive smaller than average 
shares. Similarly, the constant mill age rate tends to be more costly for those 
localities which actually grow the fastest.
The focus of Table 16 is on the costs of the regional economic growth and 
development fund because it is not known what the future spending might be. 
The overall impression is that none of the plans are very costly on either a 
per capita basis or relative to total property tax receipts. But the absolute 
difference in costs to the local jurisdictions across the three plans may seem 
surprising.
V. Conclusions
The central notion of tax base sharing is that the business tax base is 
legitimately a regional resource because firms are concentrated in a few 
jurisdictions while people are not. This situation has arisen in part because
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political boundaries were established many years ago and no longer define 
self-contained economic areas. The net result of this fragmentation is that 
inequities have arisen across localities both in the demand of residents for 
services and in the ability of local governments to provide those services.
These imbalances undoubtedly contribute to the inter-jurisdictional 
disputes which seem so commonplace today in many areas of the nation. 
Moreover, communities compete aggressively for new business development because 
it is widely perceived that the local benefits of expansion far exceed their 
costs. This "winner take all" type of competition and squabbling within a 
region may actually disrupt economic development because firms have a vital 
stake in the health of the entire region. Even if a firm does not sell its 
product locally, its survival still depends on the quantity and quality of the 
local labor force, which resides throughout the area, as well as the quantity 
and quality of the many local services consumed in producing its product.
But it is impractical to redraw local boundaries, and it would be an 
expensive duplication to establish a new level of government. Besides, making 
such changes would be very disruptive. From this perspective, tax base sharing 
can be viewed as a modest attempt to gradually reverse the fiscal imbalances or 
disparities which have evolved over the past years without diminishing the 
legal authority of local governments.
The plan calls for some portion of the growth in the business tax base to
be shared by all local jurisdictions regardless of where that new development
occurs. This approach protects the existing tax base of local jurisdictions
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and reserves for local use the bulk of the future growth in that tax base. 
This part of the plan is designed to insure that localities have sufficient 
funds to finance local governmental services, including those directly required 
by new businesses.
It should also be emphasized that local jurisdictions are guaranteed a 
minimum share of the pooled tax base. Over time, the shared or pooled portion 
of the tax base grows, allowing all communities to benefit from regional 
economic growth and development regardless of where that growth occurs. Under 
tax base sharing a major new business like the auto assembly plant examined in 
this paper would create not only substantial new tax base for the locality in 
which it locates but also it would add modestly to the tax base of other 
communities in the area. This new tax base would help those districts to pay 
for the additional services, e.g., police, roads, schools, and others, that 
would be required throughout the region to support such a plant. Tax base 
sharing thereby provides an incentive for regional cooperation and hopefully 
the evolution of a more unified economic development effort.
Advocates of tax base sharing argue strongly and sometimes fervently that 
this plan is fairer to taxpayers at the same time that it promotes regional 
economic growth. In other words, advocates believe that tax base sharing 
creates a "win-win" situation for the region. The problem is not that these 
arguments are false but that their acceptance requires a much broader 
perspective than either local taxpayers or governments usually take in making 
local policy decisions.
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Recalling the auto assembly plant once again, advocates view the shared 
pool as a plus for the region. They would claim that such regional cooperation 
and sharing might even influence the firm's location decision. They would 
argue that it is in the self-interest of the local jurisdiction in which the 
plant is located to share tax base/revenues with the other districts in order 
to help provide that plant and its employees with the necessary local 
governmental services. The simulation of the taxes and revenues generated by 
such a new auto assembly plant showed convincingly that the local district 
acquiring the plant would have more than adequate resources to support 
sharing. After sharing, it remained the richest district in the area, even 
assuming a doubling of the population in that district.
But the truth is that many taxpayers and local governments would not take 
such a broad perspective in evaluating tax base sharing. They would see the 
shared pool as tax monies that could be theirs instead of other jurisdictions. 
They would maintain that their residents make only minimal use of the services 
of other districts. They would likely dismiss any suggestion that someday the 
growth in the business tax base of their district might be behind that of other 
districts in the region, in spite of the fact that such reversals of local 
fortunes have occurred in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. Furthermore, it 
should also be noted that once growth has occurred a local district could 
always check to see if it would have been better off under the old regime of 
taxation and develop its position on tax base sharing on that basis alone.
Thus, although tax base sharing maintains the existing legal authority of 
local governments, it still requires a shift to regional thinking and the
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development of a greater spirit of cooperation throughout the area. Such a new 
perspective may not be easy to bring about in Kalamazoo County.
Limitations
This study of tax base sharing has been described as a preliminary 
empirical inquiry, so there are necessarily many limitations herein. Many of 
these have been pointed out along the way and will not be repeated here. But 
two broad limitations, perhaps cautions, are discussed briefly now.
First, and most important, the conclusions of this study are drawn from a 
limited number of simulations. Many other variations to tax base sharing are 
undoubtedly possible by changing the contribution or distribution formulas, by 
adding various limiters to insure that the gains and losses are within 
politically acceptable ranges, etc. It is possible that there may exist a tax 
base sharing scheme more appropriate for Kalamazoo County than those which were 
examined here.
Second, many simplifying assumptions were made in this study about the 
institutional framework which would govern the operation of any tax base 
sharing plan in Michigan. Some aspects of the general property tax system in 
Michigan were actually ignored, while others were included to some extent. For 
example, there was no investigation of the many legal questions which tax base 
sharing would undoubtedly raise. Overlapping jurisdictions were excluded 
because of computational difficulties. On the other hand, property tax 
abatements were included in the analysis because they may be an important
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component of the future growth of the business tax base. The point is that 
others will have to investigate the legal ramifications of tax base sharing, 
the administrative requirements which it would impose on the region, and other 
institutional questions relevant to tax base sharing.
Obviously, we tried to be reasonable and objective both in selecting 
simulations for the study and in making assumptions pertaining to those 
simulations. We also have reported a large amount of data to allow others to 
draw their own conclusions. But there is no doubt that implementation of tax 
base sharing would require fuller consideration of many issues.
Impacts of Tax Base Sharing on Kalamazoo County
Much of the focus of this paper has been on the Minnesota Plan for tax base 
sharing and the impacts that it would have on the local jurisdictions of 
Kalamazoo County. But other alternatives were explored also. Some of these 
represented only minor modifications to the Minnesota Plan, but two of them, 
tax base sharing using local rates and the possibility for a regional economic 
growth and development fund, differ more substantively from the Minnesota Plan.
Before examining what we have learned from the simulations, however, it 
should be emphasized that the conclusions are drawn strictly from the 
experience of the last decade in Kalamazoo County. If future events differ 
significantly from this recent history, then the impacts of tax base sharing 
may differ as well. Furthermore, it should be remembered that no tax scheme is 
likely to be perfect. So perhaps the wisest course of action is to evaluate
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tax base sharing on the basis of whether or not it will likely be an 
improvement over the current system. Ultimately it is the voters who must make 
this judgment.
There appears to be little doubt that disparities in fiscal capacity exist 
among the local jurisdictions in Kalamazoo County, at least as measured by 
total property values per capita or total income per capita. Furthermore, 
there is a wide divergence across localities in terms of their business tax 
bases per capita. In general this means that some localities are better able 
than others to support local governmental services. It also implies that tax 
base sharing has the potential to correct some of these disparities.
The simulations conducted in this study showed that tax base sharing would 
reduce fiscal disparities in Kalamazoo County. Moreover, this conclusion 
changes to only a small degree whether the Minnesota Plan or one of the 
alternatives is considered. In all cases, the net recipients tend to be those 
jurisdictions with lower than average income or total taxable values per 
capita, and the net contributors tend to be those areas with higher than 
average incomes or total taxable values per capita. Even using simple relative 
population as the basis for distribution would be mildly redistributive across 
the local jurisdictions in Kalamazoo County.
Although the Minnesota Plan shares nominal business growth, which includes 
growth due to inflation, one of the options evaluated in this paper was to 
share only the real growth in the business property tax base, i.e., growth 
above the rate of inflation. In some ways this possibility is appealing
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because it would help local jurisdictions meet increases in their budgets due 
solely to inflation. But it was found that in the last decade there has not 
been much real growth in the business tax base of Kalamazoo County. 
Specifically, about three-fourths of the growth in the business tax base 
countywide has been due to inflationary price increases. Thus, however 
meritorious it may be to share only real business growth, the bottom line is 
that sharing of real growth in Kalamazoo County essentially means sharing no 
growth.
Turning our attention to the differences among the various tax base sharing 
plans, it should be clear that the Minnesota Plan impacts business firms to a 
far greater degree than other taxpayers. This occurs because firms pay the 
average regionwide tax rate on property in the regional pool. So, as the 
shared pool grows over time and becomes relatively more important as a 
proportion of the total business tax base, business tax rates converge toward 
the regional average.
In contrast, tax base sharing using the local rates of individual 
jurisdictions spreads the effects of the program across all taxpayers. In 
essence, the size of the regional pool remains a function of the growth in the 
business tax base, while the tax effects of the regional pool are shared 
equally among all taxpayers. As a result of this spreading of the effects of 
the program, there is very little convergence of tax rates toward the regional 
average. This also necessarily means that tax base sharing using local rates 
has far less effect on business taxpayers than the Minnesota Plan does.
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This equal treatment of taxpayers is one of the reasons that tax base 
sharing using local rates might be more acceptable to Michigan voters than the 
Minnesota Plan. It is also likely that the Minnesota Plan would be more 
subject to legal challenge in Michigan than tax base sharing using local 
rates. Both factors probably help to explain why Michigan House Bill 4859 is 
structured to support tax base sharing using local rates rather than the 
Minnesota Plan which applies the average rate in the region to business 
property in the regional pool.
Another key distinction among the tax base sharing programs is that in the 
simulations of the Minnesota Plan only four jurisdictions in Kalamazoo County 
were net recipients, whereas that number increased to fourteen with tax base 
sharing using local rates. At the same time, tax base sharing using local 
rates reduced the losses and gains absolutely vis-a-vis the Minnesota Plan. 
This means that the redistribution effects were smaller across the local 
jurisdictions. Advocates of tax base sharing might argue against such a 
flatter distribution, but it may help to make tax base sharing using local 
rates more acceptable politically.
Finally, it should be mentioned that a regional economic growth and 
development fund could be established jointly with one of the tax base sharing 
plans or it could be supported by the local jurisdictions without tax base 
sharing. The purpose of the fund would be to allow the districts to undertake 
joint projects which would enhance regionwide growth but which would not 
otherwise be accomplished in the absence of such a fund.
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In conclusion, the finding of lackluster real growth in Kalamazoo County, 
whether looking at the growth in the business tax base or population, 
highlights the need for innovative thinking about the future of this area. 
Whether or not tax base sharing is found to be one avenue to achieve regional 
cooperation and to enhance regional economic growth and development, it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that new solutions to regional problems are 
needed.
It is commonplace to read today that firms must adjust to the new 
requirements of the so-called information age, to new and sometimes 
revolutionary production processes, and to the existence of worldwide markets, 
It is less commonplace, but perhaps equally important to suggest that local 
governments must be willing to adapt to this new environment as well. If a 
region is going to grow and prosper in the years ahead, it will require the 
participation of all sectors of the economy.
APPENDICES TO ACCOMPANY
TAX BASE SHARING: 
SIMULATIONS FOR KALAMAZOO COUNTY
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Appendix A
Step-by-Step Calculation 
of the Minnesota Plan for Tax Base Sharing
Note: The columns of Appendix Table A.I have been numbered consecutively to 
correspond exactly with the numbering in this outline.
1. The simulation of the impacts of tax base sharing is conducted for a single 
tax year, 1985, for the 19 townships/cities in Kalamazoo County, the basic tax 
collection units. Overlapping jurisdictions such as villages and schools are 
not included in this analysis.
2-3. The first major step in tax base sharing is to determine the 
contributions to the regional pool (columns 2 thru 5 in the table). The total 
business tax base is the state equalized valuation of all real commercial and 
industrial property plus the taxable value of real property currently granted 
special tax status by Public Acts 198 and 255. Thus, property tax abatements 
have been included in this analysis but only to the extent to which that 
property remains taxable. Business personal property has been excluded.
4. It is assumed in this simulation that the growth in the business tax base 
from 1979 to 1985 is that which is potentially available for sharing. The 
selection of the base year of 1979 allows for reasonable growth in the business 
tax base from that year to the current year. But it also means that the 
existing business tax base in 1979 in each jurisdiction is protected from the 
effects of tax base sharing. In other words, any local jurisdiction which
TABLE A.I
STEP BY STEP CALCULATIONS OF THE EFfiflJTS OF THE MINNESOTA PLAN 
FOR TAX BASE SHARING ON KALAMAZOO COUNTY, 1985
(1)
Townships
Alamo
Brady
Charleston
Climax
Constock
Cooper
Kalaraazoo
Oshtemo
Pavllllon
Prairie Ronde
Richland
Roes
Schoolcraft
Texas
wakeshma
Cities
Galesburg
Kalanazoo
Parchment
Portage
Total
Business
Tax Base
(1979 SEV)
(2)
1,270,190
713,606
723,965
681,376
52,453,525
2,344,800
38,541,349
37,431,166
2,157,323
286,655
6,453,778
3,386,279
9,863,717
2,371,821
212,223
2,918,186
205,497,025
9,982,059
110,001,400
Total
Business
Tax Base
(1985 SEV)
(3)
2,543,900
1,299,900
3,703,000
1,048,200
61,555,450
3,845,363
48,846,900
57,503,500
3,836,359
460,648
11,458,646
5,755,470
13,823,800
4,420,850
254,450
4,162,300
255,035,075
12,959,195
210,302,100
Growth in
Business
Tax Base
(1979 - 85)
(4)
1,273,710
586,094
2,979,035
366.824
9,101,925
1,500,563
10,305,551
20,072,334
1,679,037
173,993
5,004,868
2,369,191
3,960,084
2,049,030
42.227
1,244,114
49,538,050
2,977,136
100,300,700
Contributed
Share
(40% of
Increase)
(5)
509,484
234,438
1,191,614
146,730
3,640,770
600,225
4,122,220
8,028,934
671,615
69,597
2,001,947
947,676
1,584,033
819,612
16,891
497,646
19,815,220
1.190,854
40,120,280
Population
(1980)
(6)
2.909
3,852
1,748
1,978
11,162
8,434
20,942
10,958
4,811
1,189
4,677
4,747
6,435
5.643
1,375
1,822
79,722
1,817
38,157
Total
Tax Base
(1985 SEV)
(7)
30,658,800
40,563,175
22,487,771
22,784,700
144,697,050
73,981,983
175.509,100
136,624,508
48,061,959
20,900,486
67.086.451
68,589,209
71,101,479
83,845,410
17,041,900
10,814,400
627.065,900
26,647,795
513,516,400
Total
SEV per
Capita
(8)
10,539
10,530
12,865
11,519
12,963
8,772
8,381
12,468
9,990
17,578
14,344
14,449
11,049
14,858
12,394
5,935
7,866
14,666
13,458
Net Change In
Distributed
Share
(9)
1,090,113
1,444,707
536,631
678,185
3,400,663
3,797,348
9,869,062
3,471,149
1,901,991
267,145
1,287,772
1,297,543
2,300,158
1,499.961
438,154
1,212,365
40,029,706
489,314
11,197,816
Tax Base due
to Sharing
(10)
580,629
1,210,270
(654,983)
531,456
(240,107)
3,197,123
5,746,842
(4,557.785)
1,230,376
197,547
(714,175)
349,867
716,125
680,349
421,263
714,720
20,214,486
(701.540)
(28,922,464)
Townships
Alamo
Brady
Charleston
Climax
Comstock
Cooper
Kalatnazoo
Oshtemo
Pavllllon
Prairie Ronde
Richland
Ross
Schoolcraft
Texas
wakeshna
Cities
Galesburg
Kalamazoo
Parchment
Portage
County Total 487,290,642 702,815,106 215,524,464 86,209,786 212,378 2,201,978,476 10,368 86,209,786 County Total
TABLE A.I (Continued)
STEP BY STEP CALCULATIONS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE MINNESOTA PLAN 
FOR TAX BASE SHARING ON KALAMAZOO COUNTY, 1985
Townships
Alamo
Brady
Charleston
Climax
Comstock
Cooper
Kalamazoo
Oshtano
Pavlllion
Prairie Ronde
Richland
Ross
Schoolcraft
Texas
Wakeshna
Cities
Galesburg
Kalamazoo
Parchment
Portage
Tax Rate
without
Sharing
(1985)
(11)
1.0000
1.0000
0.9534
0.8782
4.4868
0.9423
9.5000
2.5857
0.9987
0.8125
1.4282
1.3380
1.0000
1.0482
0.7881
9.9390
19.8060
10.0000
9.7017
Implied
Revenue
without
Sharing
(12)
30,659
40,563
21,440
20,010
649,227
69,713
1,667,336
353,270
47,999
16,982
95,813
91,772
71,101
87.887
13,431
107,484
12,419,667
266,478
4.981,982
Overall
Tax Rate
with
Sharing
(13)
0.9814
0.9710
0.9820
0.8582
4.4943
0.9033
9.1988
2.6749
0.9738
0.8049
1.4436
1.3312
0.9900
1.0398
0.7691
9.3229
19.1875
10.2704
10.2807
Revenue
Required
from Pool
(14)
1,070
1,403
527
582
15,283
3,430
90,783
9,285
1,852
215
1,859
1,727
2,277
1,560
337
11,303
768,068
5,025
115,122
Contributed Share 
of Business 
Tax Base as a
proportion of
Total Business
Tax Base
(15)
0.200
0.180
0.322
0.140
0.059
0.156
0.084
0.140
0.175
0.151
0.175
0.165
0.115
0.185
0.066
0.120
0.078
0.092
0.191
Composite Net Change in
Business Tax
Rate with
Sharing
(16)
3.1817
2.9542
4.5171
2.4133
4.9363
2.6303
9.4324
3.9724
2.8984
2.4914
3.2822
3.0825
2 . 2479
3.0657
1.5125
9.6390
18.6265
10.4263
10.6025
Taxes Due Net Change in
with
Sharing
(17)
5,027
1,403
13,734
1,174
28,287
3,753
(41,451)
86,801
6,185
618
22,099
9,614
16,680
8,249
(135)
(5,347)
(530,931)
9,226
365,015
Taxes Due
per Capita
(18)
1.73
0.36
7.86
0.59
2.53
0.45
(1.98)
7.92
1.29
0.52
4.73
2.03
2.59
1.46
(0.10)
(2.93)
(6.66)
5.08
9.57
Townships
Alamo
Brady
Charleston
Climax
Comstock
Cooper
Kalamazoo
Oshtemo
Pavlllion
Prairie Ronde
Richland
Ross
Schoolcraft
Texas
Wakeshma
Cities
Galesburg
Kalamazoo
Parchment
Portage
County Total 21,052.815 1,031,709 0.123 11.8130 0.00 County Total
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ceased growing after 1979 will contribute very little to the regional pool, 
just the opposite for those areas which grow rapidly after 1979.
5. In the Minnesota Plan each local jurisdiction contributes 40 percent of the 
increase in its business tax base. The sum of these contributions, 
$86,209,786, constitutes the total regional tax base pool in 1985 in Kalamazoo 
County. Notice that the size of the regional pool is a function of time, the 
growth rate of the region, and the proportion of that growth which is 
contributed to the pool.
6. The next major step in tax base sharing is to distribute 100 percent of the 
regional pool back to the localities (columns 6 thru 9 in the table). This 
requires data on both population and the total tax base of each locality. In 
this simulation population is fixed at the 1980 values, the date of the last 
census, due to the lack of more recent local data. In the Minnesota Plan, the 
Metropolitan Council for the Twin Cities Area estimates the population in all 
local jurisdictions (about 200) annually.
7. The total tax base constitutes the business tax base plus residential, 
agricultural, and developmental real property. Remember that personal property 
has been excluded and that only the taxable value of property with abatements 
has been included.
8. The total tax base per capita (column 7 divided by column 6) is the key 
element in determining the distribution of the shares from the regional pool.
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This is the crucial measure of fiscal capacity. Notice that the countywide 
regional average is $10,368 in 1985.
9. In the Minnesota Plan the tax base shares actually distributed to each 
local jurisdiction are inversely related to the total tax base per capita. The 
net effect of the distribution formula is that a jurisdiction with a lower than 
average property tax base per capita will receive a higher than average share 
from the regional pool. The details of these calculations are not shown in the 
table, but they are summarized mathematically in Appendix B.
10. The difference between the distributed shares and the contributed shares 
constitutes the net gain/loss of tax base due to sharing. A positive number 
indicates a gain in tax base, while a negative number indicates a loss in tax 
base. The sum of the gains and losses across the local jurisdictions is zero 
because tax base sharing only redistributes the existing tax base.
11. The next major step in tax base sharing is to calculate the regionwide tax 
rate which must be levied on business property in the regional pool (column 11 
thru 14 in the table). The tax rate without sharing is the effective 
township/city tax rate in 1985. These rates were compiled from various reports 
of the Kalamazoo County Equalization Department but adjusted to include 
district-wide special taxes. Thus, school taxes (all levels), village taxes, 
and, of course, all county-wide taxes are excluded from this analysis.
The administration of tax base sharing would require various lags to insure 
that the tax base was actually distributed prior to the budget setting cycle.
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Those lags are not accounted for in this historical simulation, but neither 
would they have any material effects on the results.
12. The total tax base without sharing (column 7) times the tax rate without 
sharing equals the implied revenue required from the local property tax base in 
each jurisdiction. This is the revenue that each jurisdiction independently 
determined that it needed in 1985. It will be used as the basis for comparing 
the effects of tax base sharing with the current system of no tax base sharing.
It should be noted that such comparisons are inevitably artificial because 
there is no guarantee that localities will have identical budgets with tax base 
sharing as they would without it. It is also true that in reality localities 
do not know the future growth rate of their business tax base. Nonetheless, 
the assumption of fixed budgets is probably the "least objectionable," and it 
is the type of analysis that local jurisdictions would likely perform in 
evaluating tax base sharing.
13. The overall tax rate with tax base sharing is simply the implied revenue 
required originally (column 12) divided by the new tax base with sharing. The 
new tax base with sharing is not shown separately in the table but it is the 
sum of the total tax base (column 7) less the contributed tax base to the 
regional pool (column 5) plus the distributed tax base from the regional pool 
(column 9). This overall tax rate with tax base sharing is important because 
it represents the actual tax rate which will be levied on all nonbusiness 
property and a portion of local business property. Notice that tax base
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sharing modestly impacts all tax rates in the region (compare column 11 to 
column 13).
14. Each locality's claim on the regional pool is limited to the overall tax 
rate with sharing (column 13) times the distribution of tax base which that 
locality received from the regional pool (column 9). This means that each 
jurisdiction only receives from the regional pool a sum of money equal to that 
jurisdiction's willingness to tax all of its residents.
This point is a key feature of tax base sharing and deserves further 
comment. Each locality continues to independently make its own spending 
decisions with tax base sharing, albeit with slightly more or less tax base. A 
locality's ability to raid the regional pool is limited by the size of the tax 
base received from the regional pool and by its willingness to tax all of its 
citizens by that same mi 11 age rate.
The tax rate actually levied and paid on business property, however, is 
determined differently with tax base sharing. Firms pay the local rate of 
their jurisdiction on the unshared portion of business property and a 
region-wide shared rate on business property in the regional pool. This 
region-wide average rate is simply the sum of the claims on the regional pool 
(the sum of column 14) divided by the value of the property in the pool (the 
sum of column 5). This results in a millage rate of 11.8130 for all business 
property in the regional pool in this example.
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15. One way to calculate the composite tax rate to be applied to business firms 
is to first express the contributed share of the local business tax base as a 
proportion of the total business tax base in each locality (column 5 divided by 
column 3).
16. The composite business tax rate which each firm pays is then the proportion 
from column 15 times the regional tax rate of 11.8130 plus 1 minus the 
proportion in column 15 times the local tax rate. In other words, business 
firms continue to pay the local tax rate on the unshared portion of business 
property but pay the regional average rate on the shared portion of business 
property.
For example, a firm located in Alamo Township would pay the regional rate 
of 11.8130 on 20 percent of its business property and the local rate of .9814 
on the remaining 80 percent of its property. The composite tax rate for firms 
in Alamo Township is therefore 3.1817 mills.
17. Given the tax rates actually levied with tax base sharing it is possible to 
compare the taxes due in each locality with what they would have paid with no 
tax base sharing (remember the assumption, however, that the implied revenue 
required in each jurisdiction remains fixed). The difference is what taxpayers 
in these jurisdictions gain or lose from tax base sharing. A positive number 
in this instance indicates that taxpayers on average must pay more taxes, a 
negative number less taxes.
18. The same gains or losses (from column 17) are restated on a per capita 
basis to provide a better perspective on the size of the transfers.
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Appendix B
Technical Description of the Contribution 
and Distribution Formulas in the Minnesota 
Plan for Tax Base Sharing
1. Each locality's contribution of tax base to the regional pool is given by
cj • z < Bt - Bb>
where
cJ = the contribution of tax base to the regional pool for each 
local community i in year t
Z = proportion of the growth in the business tax base which will 
be shared (40 percent in the Minnesota case)
B? = the state equalized valuation of business property in 
community i in year t
B? = the state equalized valuation of business property in the 
base year in community i in year t
If B? > B?, then the locality's contribution to the regional pool is 
zero for that year, although it remains eligible for a distribution of 
tax base from the regional pool.
2. The total regional pool is simply the sum of the contributions of each 
community, or
1
where
C. = total regional pool in year t
n = total number of communities in the region which have agreed 
to participate in tax base sharing.
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3. Each locality's distribution from the regional pool is given by
D; - c.
n .
where
D. = the distribution received by each local community i in 
year t
1^ = distribution index value for community i 
4. The sum of the distributions of tax base from the regional pool is given by
where
D. = total regional pool in year t 
5. In the Minnesota Plan the distribution index values are calculated as
,;.«{
or
M= Nt
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whichever is greater, where
N. = population of community i in year t
Y? = per capita state equalized valuation of all property in 
in community i
Y. = average per capita state equalized valuation of all 
property in the region
If Yj > 27, then the alternative distribution index, 1^ = N^, will be
greater than the primary index. This provision effectively sets a 
minimum on the distribution that a wealthy community would receive.
6. Regardless of how the index values are calculated,
as long as
E I? = 1 
i
thus insuring that the distributions from the regional pool exhaust the 
contributions to the regional pool. In general, however,
Indeed, it would be pure chance if a community's contribution to the 
regional pool exactly equaled the distribution it received from the 
regional pool.
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Appendix C
Step-by-Step Calculation of Tax Base Sharing 
as Proposed by Michigan House Bill 4859
Note: The columns of Appendix Table C.I have been numbered consecutively to 
correspond exactly with the numbering in this outline. The description which 
follows highlights the differences with the Minnesota Plan and should therefore 
be used in conjunction with Appendix A.
1. The jurisdictions are the same as those in the Minnesota Plan. The 
simulation is conducted for a single tax year, 1985, assuming a base year of 
1979. Remember that overlapping jurisdictions are not included in this 
analysis.
2-5. The tax base contributed to the regional pool is determined in the same 
way as the Minnesota Plan, 40 percent of the nominal growth since the base 
year. In this simulation, however, the business tax base is defined to include 
personal property (the machinery and equipment of business) as well as 
structures and land. Once again, tax abatements are included in these totals.
6-7. The contributed tax base is not really shared but it is used to determine 
the revenue which each jurisdiction contributes to the regional pool -- the 
local tax rate (column 6) times the contributed tax base (column 5). The 
resultant revenue contributed to the regional pool is shown in Column 7.
8-11. The distribution of revenue from the regional pool (column 11) is a 
function of population, income, and tax effort (columns 8 thru 10). The
TABLE C.I
STEP BY STEP CALCULATIONS OF THE EFFECTS OF TAX BASE SHARING 
ON KALAMAZOO COUNTY, 1985, AS PROPOSED IN HOUSE BILL 4859
(1)
Townsnlps
Alamo
Brady
Charleston
Climax
Corns tock
Cooper
Kalamazoo
Oshtemo
Pavllllon
Prairie Ronde
Rlchland
Rose
Schoolcraft
Texas
Wakeshma
Total
Business
Tax Base
(1979)
(2)
3,030,890
2,732.911
1,647,515
1,160,427
77,174,837
5.893,307
63,836,974
45,075,216
4,488,412
1,373,488
9,244,611
5,295,384
16,462,231
4,535,566
768,033
Total
Business
Tax Base
(1985)
O)
4,695,600
3,900,002
7,560,282
1,679,446
97,014,617
8,209,527
76,296,050
71.786,075
6,958,749
1,763,716
16,208,610
8,498,880
22,578,900
7,557,375
862,348
Growth In
Business
Tax Base
(1979-85)
(4)
1,664,710
1,167,091
5,912,767
519,019
19,839,780
2,316,221
12,459,076
26,710,859
2,470,338
390,228
6,963,999
3,203,496
6,116,670
3,021,810
94,315
Contributed
Share
(40% of
Increase)
(5)
665,884
466,836
2,365,107
207.608
7,935,912
926,488
4,983,630
10,684.344
988,135
156,091
2,785,600
1,281,398
2,446,668
1,208,724
37,726
Tax Rate
without
Sharing
(1985)
(6)
1.0000
1.0000
0.9534
0.8782
4.4868
0.9423
9.5000
2.5857
0.9987
0.8125
1.4282
1.3380
1 .0000
1.0482
0.7881
Revenue
Contributed
to Regional
Pool
(7)
666
467
2,255
182
35,607
873
47,344
27,627
987
127
3,978
1,715
2,447
1,267
30
Townships
Alamo
Brady
Charleston
Climax
Comstock
Cooper
Kalamazoo
Oshtemo
Pavllllon
Prairie Ronde
Rlchland
Ross
Schoolcraft
Texas
Wakeshma
Cities
3,406,086
283,498,325
19,600,148
158,954.300
5,394.403
380.594.119
28.174.516
306.667,200
1.988,317
97,095,794
8,574,368
147,712,900
795,327
38.838.318
3.429,747
59.085,160
9.9390
19.8060
10.0000
9.7017
7.905
769,232
34,297
573.226
Cities
Galesburg 
Kalamazoo 
Parchment 
Portage
County Total 708.178,659 1,056,400,415 348,221,756 139,288,702 1.510,231 County Total
TABLE C.I (Continued)
STEP BY STEP CALCULATIONS OF THE EFFECTS OF TAX BASE SHARING 
ON KALAMAZOO COUNTY, 1985, AS PROPOSED IN HOUSE BILL 4859
Implied
Townships
Alamo
Brady
Charleston
Climax
Comstock
Cooper
Kalamazoo
Oshtemo
Pavi11ion
Prairie Ronde
Richland
Ross
Schoolcraft
Texas
Wakeshma
Cities
Galesburg
Kalamazoo
Parchment
Portage
Population
(1980)
(8)
2,909
3,852
1,748
1,978
11,162
8,434
20,942
10,958
4,811
1,189
4,677
4,747
6,435
5,643
1,375
1,822
79,722
1,817
38,157
Per 
Capita
Income
(1981)
(9)
8,006
9,038
9,853
8,071
8,528
8,759
8,917
9,841
8,558
7,793
11,260
11,824
8,909
10,364
7,610
7,121
8,129
9,749
10.190
Budget 
from Local 
Property
Tax
(1985)
(10)
32,811
43,163
25,117
20,564
808,325
73,826
1,928,103
390,200
51,118
18,040
102,597
95,443
79,857
91,174
13,910
119,730
14,906,490
418,631
5,916,887
Revenue 
Distributed 
from
Regional
Pool
(11)
2,302
2,376
1,163
1,419
49,975
4,327
109,031
18.116
3,138
1,336
3,638
3,070
4,524
3,817
1,080
10,616
1,014,284
19,805
256,214
Net
Change in
Revenue
(12)
1,636
1,909
(1,092)
1,237
14,368
3,454
61,687
(9,510)
2,151
1,209
(340)
1,355
2,077
2,550
1,050
2,712
245,052
(14,493)
(317,012)
Net 
Change In 
Taxes Due
with
Sharing
(13)
(1,636)
(1,909)
1,092
(1,237)
(14,368)
(3,454)
(61,687)
9,510
(2,151)
(1,209)
340
(1.355)
(2,077)
(2,550)
(1,050)
(2,712)
(245,052)
14,493
317,012
Net 
Change in
Taxes Due
per
Capita
(14)
(0.56)
(0.50)
0.62
(0.63)
(1.29)
(0.41)
(2.95)
0.87
(0.45)
(1.02)
0.07
(0.29)
(0.32)
(0.45)
(0.76)
(1.49)
(3.07)
7.98
8.31
Tax Rate
with
Sharing
(15)
0.9501
0.9558
0.9948
0.8254
4.4070
0.8982
9.1961
2.6487
0.9567
0.7581
1.4329
1.3190
0.9740
1.0189
0.7286
9.7139
19.4804
10.3462
10.2215
Net
Change in
Tax Rates
(16)
-0.0499
-0.0442
0.0414
-0.0528
-0.0798
-0.0441
-0.3039
0.0630
-0.0420
-0.0544
0.0047
-0.0190
-0.0260
-0.0293
-0.0595
-0.2251
-0.3256
0.3462
0.5198
Townships
Alamo
Brady
Charleston
Climax
Comstock
Cooper
Kalamazoo
Oshtemo
Pavillion
Prairie Ronde
Richland
Ross
Schoolcraf t
Texas
Wakeshma
Cities
Galesburg
Kalamazoo
Parchment
Portage
County Total 212,378 8,991 25,135,987 1,510,231 (0) County Total
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details of these calculations are not shown here but the specific mathematical 
approach follows the federal general revenue sharing formula, more specifically 
the U.S. Senate three factor formula. A mathematical summary of the 
distribution formula can be found in Appendix D.
12. The net change in each jurisdiction's revenue is simply the distributed 
revenue minus the contributed revenue of that jurisdiction. Notice, once 
again, that the sum of these changes is zero since 100 percent of the 
contributions are redistributed to the local jurisdictions.
13. This column may be superfluous, but it is important to understand that 
under the assumption of fixed budgets at the level of spending which existed 
without sharing (column 10), the net change in revenue due to sharing implies 
exactly the opposite requirement for local taxpayers. In other words, if the 
net change in revenue is positive due to sharing, then that allows a locality 
to lower the amount of taxes it collects from local taxpayers to support a 
fixed budget. Of course, there is no guarantee that localities would maintain 
identical budgets with sharing that they had without sharing, but this 
assumption appears less "biased" than other alternatives.
14. The change in taxes due from column 13 are restated here on a per capita 
basis to provide a better perspective of the size of the transfers between 
localities.
15. The new overall tax rates required with sharing are shown in this column. 
Notice that there is no shared tax rate for business property like the 
Minnesota Plan. This approach affects only the overall tax rate in a district.
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16. The net change in the rates is calculated as the rate with sharing minus 
the rate without sharing. Thus a positive number in this column indicates that 
taxpayers would pay higher tax rates with sharing than without sharing, a 
negative number lower tax rates with sharing than without.
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Appendix D
Technical Description of the 
Federal General Revenue Sharing Formula
1. The U.S. Senate three factor general revenue sharing formula relates a 
community's share, S, directly to that community's population and tax 
effort and inversely to per capita income. For the application to 
Kalamazoo county it can be stated mathematically as
p; (A.} ( PCYt }\ YJ. / \ PCYJ /
" pi / T! \ / PCY= \
- , t I ———T- —————?- 1
1=1 \ Yl / \ PCYl /
where
S 1. = the proportion or share of revenue due each community i in 
year t
p] = population of community i in year t
T. = property tax collections in community i in year t
Y. = income in community i in year t
U
PCY^ = per capita income in the county in year t 
PCY. = per capita income in community i in year t
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2. The three factors of population (P), tax effort (-77 » and relative
income / PCYC \ are multiplicatively related. The divisor, of
V PCY 1 / 
course, constitutes the simple summation of the product of the three
factors for each community and thereby insures that all funds to be shared
n i will be exhausted, i.e., L S = 1.
3. It should be noted that the general revenue sharing formula can be reduced 
as follows:
(a)
PCY, PCY,
PCY
PCY
(b)
• \ 2
LK) 2 _
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(c) K)
(PCYJ)
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